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This article concerns what I will call the ambivalent resistance of
U.S. constitutional law to explicit learning and borrowing from other
nations' constitutional decisions and traditions. It begins in Part I by
identifying this resistance and explaining in what respects it is am-
bivalent, and goes on in Part II to suggest reasons for the resistance
and for why it may diminish in the future. To explore the attractions
and dilemmas of comparative constitutional law, Part III examines
how a particular doctrine found in Canadian constitutional law, the
so-called "proportionality" test of R. v. Oakes,' might bear on recent
constitutional issues of federalism and individual rights in the United
States. This section argues for the value of studying foreign constitu-
tional law, while at the same time urging caution about the possibility
of direct "transplants." Finally, the article explores the relationship
between the U.S. Supreme Court's resistance to considering foreign
constitutional law and its resistance to input from other domestic in-
stitutions, notably Congress, on the meaning of the U.S. Constitution.
It argues for a broader understanding of what is relevant to U.S. con-
stitutional interpretation, embracing both congressional judgments
and judgments reached by the constitutional courts of other nations
considering similar problems.
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I See [1986] 1 S.C.1L 103, 108 (holding that a statutory presumption that possession of nar-
cotics implied trafficking violated the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms and was unconstitutional because it uas not "demonstrablyjus-
tified in a free and democratic society").
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I. AMBIVALENT RESISTANCE
Members of the current U.S. Supreme Court have on more than
one occasion rejected the utility of considering constitutional prac-
tice in other countries. In 1997, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court
in Printz v. United States,2 explained why, in his view, "comparative
analysis [is] inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution,
though it was of course quite relevant to the task of writing one."3
Justice Scalia also made a narrower argument, that "our federalism is
not Europe's,"4 suggesting that European practice in federal systems
was not relevant to the question before the Court - whether Congress
had the power to compel local government officials to perform back-
ground checks under a federal gun law.
Justice Scalia was writing in response to an argument made in dis-
sent by Justice Breyer. Writing for himself and for Justice Stevens,
Justice Breyer argued that the experiences of the federal systems of
Switzerland, Germany and the European Union indicate that a system
in which local governments carry out directives of the central gov-
ernment may "interfere[] less, not more, with the independent
authority of the... subsidiary government...." Breyer suggested
that this comparative experience shows that "there is no need to in-
terpret the Constitution as containing an absolute principle forbid-
ding the assignment of virtually any federal duty to a state official" in
order to reconcile "central authority with the need to preserve the
liberty-enhancing autonomy of smaller constituent governmental en-
tit[ies]. (Justices Breyer, Stevens, Souter and Ginsberg would have
upheld the relatively small burden imposed on local sheriffs to im-
plement the background checks.)
7
2 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding unconstitutional "Brady Act" interim provisions requiring
local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on prospective gun purchasers,
based on ground that it is inconsistent with the implicit rule of U.S. federalism that the federal
government cannot "commandeer" state officers into executing federal law).3 Id. at 921 n. 11.
4 Id. In contrast, consider Justice Frankfurter's attempts earlier in this century to invoke
similarities between the constitutional federalism of the United States, of Canada and of Austra-
lia on issues of intergovernmental tax immunity. See e.g., United States v. Allegheny County, 322
U.S. 174, 198 (1944) (Frankfurter,J. dissenting) ("In respect to the problem we are consider-
ing, the constitutional relation of the Dominion of Canada to its constituent Provinces is the
same as that of the United States to the States. A recent decision of the Supreme Court of Can-
ada is therefore pertinent. In City of Vancouver v. Attorney-General of Canada [1944] S.C.R. 23,
that Court denied the Dominion's claim to immunity in a situation precisely like this, as I be-
lieve we should deny the claim of the Government."); Graves v. New York ex reL O'Keefe, 306
U.S. 466, 491 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (intergovernmental tax immunity case raises
the "same legal issues" as in Australia and Canada under cited provisions of their constitutional
acts). For a critique of Frankfurter's assumption that the constitutional relationships were the
same, see infra note 46.
Printz, 521 U.S. at 976.
6 Id. at 977.
7 The burden was not only relatively small (particularly in light of the U.S. government in-
terpretation of the "reasonable efforts" language of the statute, see Respondent's Brief at 6,
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Resistance and ambivalence: Justice Breyer argued for the rele-
vance of comparative experience in resolving an open question of
constitutional interpretation, one to be informed by understanding
the empirical consequences of different interpretations." Justice
Scalia, in contrast, acknowledged the contributions of comparative
study to the formation of the Constitution but resisted its appropri-
ateness to the task of interpretation.9 But did he resist comparative
study in Printz because it can never be appropriate? Or, did he resist
such study because the issues of federal structure somehow were
unique to the United States? And does Justice Scalia really speak for
even the fivejustice majority of the Printz Court?30
Chief Justice Rehnquist, who joined Scalia's opinion in Printz, has
taken a more receptive view of the benefits of comparative constitu-
tional law to courts in the United States, both in his opinions" and in
his other writings. In a speech given in 1989 at a symposium in con-
nection with the 40th anniversary of the German Basic Law, Chief
Justice Rehnquist stated:
For nearly a century and a half, courts in the United States
exercising the power ofjudicial review had no precedents to
look to save their own, because our courts alone exercised
this sort of authority. When many new constitutional courts
were created after the Second World War, these courts
naturally looked to decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States, among other sources, for developing their
own law. But now that constitutional law is solidly
grounded in so many countries, it is time that the United
States courts begin looking to the decisions of other consti-
tutional courts to aid in their own deliberative process. The
United States courts, and legal scholarship in our country
generally, have been somewhat laggard in relying on com-
parative law and decisions of other countries. But I predict
Pintz (No. 95-1478) citing ATF Guidances) but was also time-limited. The requirement that
local law enforcement officers perform background checks lasted for five )ars, at which time.
in November 1998, the obligation became that of the federal government, using a computer-
ized national data base developed during the interim period.
See Printz, 521 U.S. at977.
9 Seei Lat921 n.11.
0 Note that in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), ChiefJustice Rehnquist. writing
for a Court that includedJustice Scalia, cited and described decisions from other nations' con-
stiutional courts in identifying the relevant "background" to evaluate the claim that the State of
Washington's prohibition on assisted suicide violates the Due Process Clause. See id. at 718 n.16
(citing, inter aLia, a 1993 Canadian Supreme Court decision, Rdrigu: to. British C lurd ia (Attor-
ne)-Ceneral), 107 D.LR. (4th) 342 (1993), which construed the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms not to include a right to assisted suicide).
" See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 718 n.16; Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Case. 505 U.S. 833.
945 n.1 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in thejudgment in part and dissenting in part) (cit-
ing abortion decisions by the West German Constitutional Court and the Canadian Supreme
Court).
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that with so many thriving constitutional courts in the world
today ... that approach will be changed in the near fu-
ture.
But the same year as Rehnquist's 1989 speech, Justice Scalia, writ-
ing for the Court, rejected the relevance of the practice in other na-
tions, while the dissent argued to the contrary, in Stanford v. Ken-
tucky,3 a case addressing the constitutionality of the death penalty for
juveniles convicted of murder. No question of government structure
was presented, to which the claim of a uniquely American federalism
might apply; rather, the question was one of pure individual right. In
Stanford, the Court rejected a claim that the imposition of capital
punishment for crimes committed when the defendant was age 16 or
17 was cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
In the first footnote in the opinion, the Court wrote:
We emphasize that it is American conceptions of decency
that are dispositive, rejecting the contentions of petitioners
and their various amid... that the sentencing practices of
other countries are relevant. While "[t]he practices of
other nations, particularly other democracies, can be rele-
vant to determining whether a practice uniform among our
people is not merely an historical accident, but rather 'so
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' that it occupies a
place not merely in our mores, but, text permitting, in our
Constitution as well," Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,
868-869 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ... they cannot
serve to establish the first Eighth Amendment prerequisite
that the practice is accepted among our people.'
4
Other voices on the Court, however, argued that foreign constitu-
tional practices were relevant. In his Stanford dissent, Justice Bren-
nan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, wrote that
"choices of governments elsewhere in the world also merit our atten-
tion as indicators whether a punishment is acceptable in a civilized
society.' ' 5 He went on to note specifically that over fifty countries, in-
cluding nearly all of Western Europe, had formally abolished the
death penalty, twenty-seven other countries did not in practice im-
pose the death penalty, and of those countries that retained it, a ma-
jority did not permit the execution of juveniles. justice Brennan
1 William Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts-Comparative Remarks (1989), reprinted in GERMANY
AND ITS BASIC LAW: PAST, PRESENT AND FuTURE-A GERMAN-AMERICAN SYMPosIUMi 411,412 (Paul
Kirchhof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993).
is 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
14 Id. at 369 n.1 (emphasis in original).
15 Id. at 384 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
16 See id. at 389 (referring to amicus brief submitted by Amnesty International).
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and the other dissenters believed that the legal practice of other
countries was relevant, though not dispositive, on the constitutional
question of "cruel and unusual punishment." "
As cases cited by bothJustice Scalia andJustice Brennan illustrate,
at least for purposes of Eighth Amendment doctrine, standards of
punishment in other countries have on occasion been viewed as rele-
vant to the constitutional question whether a particular punishment
is "cruel and unusual."8 Earlier, in Trop v. Dulles,'9 the plurality opin-
ion of the ChiefJustice relied on the practice of other nations to con-
clude that loss of citizenship for desertion was unconstitutional, not-
ing that "banishment [is] a fate universally decried by civilized
people." 20 The Court noted further that the "international commu-
nity of democracies" deplores statelessness and that a United Nations
survey "reveal[ed] only two countries... [that] impose denationaliza-
tion as a penalty for desertion.
Opposing stances towards the relevance of practice and experi-
ence in other countries in resolving constitutional questions occur
even earlier in our constitutional history as well. In Fong Tue Ting v.
United States,2 for example, the Court upheld a statute authorizing
the deportation of Chinese laborers who did not possess a required
residency certificate unless, on the testimony of at least one "white
witness," they met the conditions to excuse them from the certificate
requirement. In so ruling, the majority began by noting the universal
practice of sovereigns to retain the right to expel aliens, a right it
found unconstrained by the Constitution.2 While the majority in-
voked foreign practices, it was the dissenting justices who invoked
American exceptionalism. According to Justice Brewer:
17 See id. ("Our cases recognize that objective indicators of contemporary standards of de-
cency in the form of legislation in other countries is also of relevance to Eighth Amendment
SeeThompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,830 (1988) (StevensJ., for the plurality) (look-
ing to "other nations that share our Anglo-American heritage," and "leading members of the
Western European community" to confirm that it would "offend civilized standards of decenct
to execute juvenile for crimes committed before age 16); Enmund v. Florida. 458 U.S. 782 , 796
n.22 (1982) (noting developments in European and Commonwealth countries for support in
holding the death penalty unconstitutional for robber who did not kill or intend to kill); Coke-
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,596 n.10 (1977) (White,J., plurality opinion) ('It is... not irrelemnt
here that out of 60 major nations in the world surveyed in 1965, only 3 retained the death pen-
alty for rape where death did not ensue.") (WhiteJ., for the plurality).
" 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
0 1d. at 102 (Warren, CJ., announcing judgment of Court and opinion joined by Black.
Douglas, and WhitakerJJ.).
21 Id. at 102-03.
149 U.S. 698, 728 (1893) (upholding federal statute providing for exclusion and remoal
of Chinese persons and for punishment at hard labor prior to removal, and further pro'iding
registration system for Chinese laborers requiring either special certificate of residence or proof
on testimony of "one credible white wimess" of their entitlement to reside).
See i. at 711 (referring to "an inherent and inalienable right of every soireign and inde-
pendent nation").
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The governments of other nations have elastic powers - ours
is fixed and bounded by a written constitution. The expul-
sion of a race may be within the inherent powers of a des-
potism. History, before the adoption of this Constitution,
was not destitute of examples of the exercise of such a
power; and its framers were familiar with history, and wisely,
as it seems to me, they gave to this government no general
power to banish.24
Justice Field also dissented. After disagreeing that English prac-
tice had been correctly described, he wrote:
[E]ven if that power [of deportation of resident aliens]
were exercised by every government of Europe, it would
have no bearing in these cases.... Spain expelled the
Moors; England, in the reign of Edward I, banished fifteen
thousand Jews; and Louis XIV, in 1685, by revoking the
Edict of Nantes, which gave religious liberty to Protestants
in France, drove out the Huguenots .... Within [the last]
three years Russia has banished many thousands of Jews,
and apparently intends the expulsion of the whole race - an
act of barbarity which has aroused the indignation of all
Christendom.... [A]l1 the instances mentioned have been
condemned for their barbarity and cruelty, and no power to
perpetrate such barbarity is to be implied from the nature
of our government, and certainly is not found in any dele-
gated powers under the Constitution. The government of
the United States is one of limited and delegated powers. It
takes nothing from the usages or the former action of European gov-
ernments, nor does it take any power by any supposed inherent sov-
ereignty.2
Perhaps just as noteworthy as the cases in which justices of the
U.S. Supreme Court discuss the relevance of foreign constitutional
practice or reasoning are the cases in which they do not, but easily
could have. For example, in 1992 the Court held, in RA. V. v. St.
24 Id. at 737 (Brewer,J. dissenting).
Id. at 757 (Field, J. dissenting) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Brewer's and
Field's claims here might be compared with the debate, in Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748
(1996), over the relevance of English constitutional history to the relative scope of congres-
sional and presidential power in determining the punishment for courts martials. The Loving
majority relied on one (somewhat contested) view of what was permitted under English law at
the time of the framing. Justice Scalia argued that this view was "irrelevant" since the framers
deliberately adopted a model of governance quite distinct from the Westminster model. See
Loving, 517 U.S. at 775-76 (ScaliaJ. concurring in part). In either event, both the majority and
Justice Scalia treated the foreign practice as relevant, if at all, only as it bore on the original un-
derstanding of the clauses in question, a significant but not exclusive mode of constitutional
decision-making in the United States.
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Pau42 6 that a local ordinance prescribing "fighting words" based on
racial bias violated the First Amendment because it amounted to a
content-based regulation. Neither the majority nor the dissent in this
closely-divided case alluded to how other constitutional governments
have addressed this problem, notwithstanding Justice Scalia's ac-
knowledgment in the opinion for the Court that "[flrom 1791 to the
present... our society, like other free but civilized societies, has
permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited ar-
eas...."2 Readily available were the opinions of the Canadian Su-
preme Court in R. v. Keegstra,2s in which that Court addressed at
length its reasons for upholding the constitutionality of a statute pro-
hibiting the "wilful promotion of hatred, other than in private con-
versation, towards any section of the public distinguished by colour,
race, religion or ethnic origin."" While the several lengthy opinions
in the Keegstra case extensively discussed U.S. First Amendment
cases,s the U.S. Supreme Court two years later was silent on this po-
tentially valuable comparative resource.
As these examples illustrate, the U.S. Supreme Court is resistant to
considering foreign constitutional law, even in areas where there are
materials close at hand that address similar problems within the con-
text of a western, liberal democratic republic (and that discuss the
U.S. Court's prior precedents). But the resistance is often seen in si-
lence. And it is ambivalent - sometimes silently, sometimes expressly.
In what respects is U.S. constitutional law ambivalent about bor-
rowing from or considering foreign constitutional decisions? First, it
is evident that the different justices are receptive in differing degrees
to the possible bearing of comparative constitutional law, with several
2 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
SI& at 382-83.
[1990] 3 S.C.R. 697. Although Canadian Supreme Court decisions are available, in Eng-
lish, in major law libraries (and were accessible on-line through QUICKLAIW beginning in
1989), Keegstra was apparenly mentioned in only one of the many briefs filed in ILA. ,: (based
on an examination of the Table of Authorities of those briefs available on LEXIS). See Brief
Amicus of the National Black Women's Health Project in Support of Respondent, RA.V. v. St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (No. 90-7675); see also Brief Amicus Curiae of the Asian-American
Legal Defense and Education Fund eL al., R.A.V. V. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (No. 90-7675)
(listing a 1989 law reiew article comparing U.S. and Canadian approaches to hate speech). If
lawyers are not aware of and do not refer to constitutional decisions of other courts, it is less
likelv that the Court will do so.
-o Keegstra [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 713.
n1 See id. at 739-42 (Dickson, CJ.); id. at 812-22 (McLaclin.J., dissenting).
Similarly, with the exception ofJustice Frankfurter's reliance on Australian and Canadian
decisions on intergovernmental tax issues, U.S. Supreme Court decisions earlier in this century
on federalism issues tended not to refer to cases from Canadian or Australian courts on analo-
gous issues. Compare Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (invalidating federal tax
designed, through exemptions, to require limits on child labor) with Re.' v. Barger, (1908) 6
C.LPR. 41 (High Court of Australia) (holding that 'implied prohibitions" of the constitution -
to protect state authority and to regulate labor conditions - invaidated federal tax on manufac-
tured goods designed, through exemptions, to impose minimal working condition require-
ments).
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current members of the Court open at least to thinking about foreign
decisions.2 Justice Scalia's rejection of the relevance of foreign con-
stitutional practices in Printz may be an outlier, notwithstanding its
appearance in his opinion for the Printz Court.33 Further, his view is
that comparative experience is relevant to making a constitution but
not to interpreting one:" On this view, to the extent that the process of
interpretation resembles the making of a constitution, comparative
experience could still be relevant.35 Finally, the view that comparative
experience is irrelevant (or less relevant) on structural issues such as
federalism, even if accepted, would not necessarily rule out its rele-
32 Some justices, present and past, resort to comparative experience in constitutional deci-
sion-making with relative degrees of comfort, sometimes to support claims of the distinctiveness
of the U.S. experience, while at other times as if they were relevant and helpful to the resolu-
tion of domestic constitutional questions. Compare Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921
n.11 (1997) (asserting irrelevance of other nations, experience to U.S. constitutional interpre-
tation), Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 775-76 (1996) (Scalia,J., concurring in part) (as-
serting that the framers of the U.S. Constitution put it in writing to make clear that it was dif-
ferent from the English government it replaced) and Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S.
698, 737, 757 (1893) (Brewer & Field,J.J., dissenting) (rejecting the applicability of the foreign
doctrine of inherent sovereignty and emphasizing the irrelevance of foreign government prac-
tices to U.S. constitutional law), with United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174, 198
(1944) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting) (relying on a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada on
the ground that the relation of Canada to its Provinces resembles that of the United States to its
States) and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (observing
that despite structural differences between legal systems, foreign legal experience "may none-
theless cast an empirical light on the consequences of different solutions to a common legal
problem").
3 And even Justice Scalia has on occasion acknowledged a (quite) limited role for foreign
practice. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868-69 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(stating that the practices of other democracies may be relevant to determining whether a prac-
tice uniformly adopted by the American people is merely a historical accident or is instead "im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty").
SeePrintz, 521 U.S. at921 n.ll.
25 In a strict jurisprudence of original intent, foreign experience may be irrelevant (except
insofar as it relates to the understandings of the original group whose intentions count). Justice
Scalia, for instance, implies that judges can only interpret, and never make, the constitution and
has worked to develop ajurisprudence that appropriately constrains judicial choices by rooting
them, wherever possible, in original decisions reflected in authoritative texts. See Antonin
Scalia, Originalism: The LesserEvil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849 (1989). Fewjustices, however, are rig-
idly committed to originalism as the sole method of interpretation, particularly on structural
issues of federalism and separation of powers, and it is a method whose drawbacks are legion.
For illustrative discussions, see H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent,
98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Inter-
pretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARv. L. REv. 781, 786-804 (1983); Ronald Dworkin, The Fo-
rum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 472-500 (1981).
That interpretation of federalism-related provisions in other constitutions may be of less
relevance than comparative decisions in other areas has some plausibility because of the deeply
and necessarily pragmatic, contextual and dynamic nature of successful constitutional federal-
ism. See generally Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?,
111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2228-29 (1998) [hereinafterJackson, Federalism]. By contrast, the indi-
vidual rights claims of the Declaration of Independence, which served as the basis for provisions
in the U.S. Bill of Rights, were designed to be appealing to an international audience and drew
on traditions of what today might be called international human rights; the international ap-
peal of human rights to be free from torture, discrimination, religious oppression are embod-
ied in several international conventions today. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and
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vance on issues of individual rights7
Moreover, courts can use comparative experience for different
reasons and in different ways. A constitution might be read to require
consideration of foreign practice or decisions, for example, as evi-
dence of a practice that bears on a criterion like "usualness" in the
Eighth Amendment arena." Alternatively, constitutional adjudica-
tion might be informed by knowledge of what institutional experi-
ences under different regimes suggest, negatively or positively, about
how the U.S. regime ought to be construed in order to work at a
structural level.'9 Further, constitutional adjudication might consider
the weight or force of the reasoning of constitutional courts orjurists
elsewhere, as Justice Rehnquist's 1989 comments seem to suggest. It
is the latter point in particular that I think meets the most resistance
in the U.S. cases.
Political Rights, art. 18, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; The International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966. S. EXEC. DOC. C, 95-2, at 1
(1978), 660 U.N.T.S. 195; The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment, openedfor signature Feb. 4, 1985, S. TREAiy Doc. NO. 100-20
(1988), 23 I.LM. 1027, as modifiA, 24 I.LNL 535; ser also Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, GA. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., art. 18, at 71, 74, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); f. Robin
West, Is the Rule of Law Cosmopolitan, - QUINNIPIAC L REV. - (forthcoming 1999) (arguing that
commitment to the rule of law should encourage egalitarian understandings of justice embod-
ied in law that are universal and that extend to people regardless of their nationalities or loca-
tions).
37 See, eg., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 718 n.16 (1997), (where Court. in an
opinion written by Rehnquist and joined by Scalia, relied in part on foreign constitutional deci-
sions denying that their constitutional bill of rights provisions protected a right to assisted sui-
cide).
Compare Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 364 n.1 (1989) (rejecting contention that
sentencing guidelines of other countries are relevant to determination of 'evolving standards of
decency") with Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 126 (1958) (Frankfurter J., dissenting) (arguing
that loss of citizenship is not cruel and unusual punishment because civilized nations use this
punishment). Constitutions can explicity require resort to foreign constitutional law. See S.
AFR. CONST. § 39(1) (b), (c) (1996) (requiring courts, when interpreting the Bill of Rights, to
consider international law, and authorizingcourts to considerforeign law).
Thus, Justice Breyer argued unsuccessfully in Pnntz v. United Stats the successful experi-
ence in other constitutional, democratic federations suggested that it was not necesmary to con-
strue our Constitution to include a non-commandeering principle. &e 521 U.S. 893, 976-78
(1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 570-71 (1923)
(HolmesJ., dissenting) (arguing that experience in other nations, including Great Britain and
Australia, supported the reasonableness, and hence the constitutionality, of a minimum wage
law for women that the Court held unconstitutional). In contrast, otherJustices haw referred
to experience in other countries as bearing, negatively, on how the Constitution should be con-
strued. See, ag., Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579. 593-94 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) (referring implicidtly to fascist dictatorships in Europe as a reason to constrain
presidential power even though it "is absurd to see a dictator in a representative product of the
sturdy democratic traditions of the Mississippi Valley"); id. at 641 (JacksonJ., concurring) (not-
ing negative example of George II and "instruction from our own times' of executive po-ers in
"totalitarian" governments).
Comparative constitutional experience may also bear on issues of constitutional design or
amendment that occur outside of adjudicatory process, but the balance of this article will focus
on adjudication.
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II. AMBIVALENT RESISTANCE: WHYAND WHY NOT
In this section, I describe some possible reasons for the Court's
ambivalence, including the shape and demands of legal education. I
go on to argue that U.S. law schools, lawyers and jurists must aban-
don their ambivalence about learning from comparative constitu-
tional law, even if they conclude that "borrowings" are not helpful.
Comparison, I suggest, has become almost inevitable in the increas-
ingly globalized world of law and information, and only deliberate
study can yield the knowledge on which to base informed analysis of
the implicit comparisons that are entailed in assertions about the
uniqueness of the U.S. Constitution.
A. Why such ambivalence?
First, the broader history and culture of "American exceptional-
ism," with its twin manifestations of idealism and naivete, of expan-
sionism and isolationism, may affect those who serve on the Supreme
Court and in the federal courts no less than those in other govern-
ment service.41 The belief that the U.S. experience is unique can be
deployed to serve both "liberal" and "conservative" views of constitu-
tional issues, as a comparison of Justice Scalia's stance in Printz v.
United States with that of the dissenting justices in Fong Yue Ting v.
42United States suggests.
Second, for some period of time until fairly recently, many U.S.
law school curriculums have had a decidedly parochial emphasis.43
41 See Michael Kammen, The United States Constitution, Public Opinion, and the Problem of Amen-
can Exceptionalism, in THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: ROOTS, RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBIIUTIES
(A.E. Dick Howard, et. al. 1992) (noting the continued importance of exceptionalism in Ameri-
can history generally and describing the longstanding role of public opinion in constitutional
adjudication). On whether "exceptionalism" in national histories is really "exceptional," see
Carl Degler, In Pursuit of an American History, 92 AM. HIST. REV. 1 (1987) (suggesting impor-
tance of understanding "national character," and arguing benefits of comparative historical
study so as to better understand what is "exceptional" about a particular nation's history). For
an example of what might be regarded as nineteenth century British constitutional exceptional-
ism, see Bank of Toronto v. Lambe [1887] 12 A.C. 575, 587 (Privy Council, reviewing Canadian
Supreme Court decision, and asserting that U.S. constitutional cases on federalism are irrele-
vant to the interpretation of the British North America Act). For what may be implicit re-
sponses of Canadian judges, see In re Prohibiting Liquor Laws [1894] 24 S.C.R. 170, 205, 231
(emphasizing intent of the Canadian framers to "devise a scheme by which the best features of
the Constitution of the United States of America, rejecting the bad, should be engrafted upon
the British constitution ... ." and asserting the fundamentally Canadian character of the British
North America Act).
42 See supra note 32 (noting their denial of the applicability of foreign practices to interpreta-
tion of U.S. constitutional law).
43 Legal training, to the extent it existed in law schools in the late eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries, may have been more "comparative" than those of the mid-twentieth century.
Both Harvard and the University of Virginia, for example, included arguably "comparative" of-
ferings as required courses in early days; at Virginia, international law (the "law of nations") was
required and at Harvard there appear to have been required lectures or courses in the civil law,
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the history of the common law, natural law and ecclesiastical law. SeJOwN RITICIE, THE FIRST
HUNDRED YEARS: A SHORT HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF LAW 01 THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINA FOR
THE PERIOD 1826-1926, at 11, 27-28, 64, 76-78, 104 (1978) (also noting that first-year curriculum
included international law as recently as 1925-26); 1 CHARLES WARREN, HSTORY OF THE
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 303, 339, 355, 436-37 (1970). When the first U.S. law schools were
founded, many of the available legal materials were from the British courts and treatise writers,
and inertia may have been responsible for their presence in the curriculum for some time. See
2 Warren supra at 344 (reporting that in 1846-47 the Harvard "Catalogue stated: 'The course of
Instruction for the bar embraces the various branches of Public and Constitutional Law, Admi-
ralty, Maritime, Equity and Common Law which are common to all the United States, with oc-
casional illustrations of Foreign Jurisprudence"). By the middle of the nineteenth century.
however, U.S. materials were increasingly available. See I WARREN, supra, at 410 (noting ad-
vances in the creation of American legal literature, including Chancellor Kent's Commentaries
by 1830); WILLIAM P. .PLAANA, LOGIC AND ENPERIENCE THE ORIGIN OF MODERMN AMERICAlN
LEGAL EDUCATION 59-60, 111 (1994) (noting publication in 1870's of texts rel)ing less on Eng-
lish precedents and more on cases from American jurisdictions and works exposing fallacies
born of reliance on Roman legal concepts).
Compared to other parts of the curriculum, international and comparative offerings and
requirements appeared to be in relative decline in the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
tury at Harvard Law School. See 2 WARREN, supra, at 411-12, 448 (displaying tables, indicating
that the curriculum in 1879-80 did not include comparative or foreign law nor did first year
classes in 1891-92 include civil law). By 1900, Harvard's curriculum was 'essentially profession-
ally oriented," and was widely emulated, ith only a few 'national schools (that] tried to be less
professional than Harvard by offering courses in such areas as international law, comparative
law and jurisprudence ...." ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDLr\TION IN AMERICA
FROM THE 1850s TO THE 1980s, at 39 (1983); see id. at 48 n.39, n.41 (reporting also that after
1899, international law was offered at Harvard only "sporadically'); set also LkPwaA. supra, at
129-30 (describing Harvard Law faculty's unwillingness to support University of Chicago's de-
sire to offer such "nonlegal" subjects as comparative politics, European political theory and ad-
ministrative law); cf. Brainerd Currie, The Aateials of Law Study, 3J. LEGAL EDuC. 331, 363-67,
374-83 (1951) (describing Harvard's influence in professionalizing study of law despite efforts
at, for instance, Columbia and Yale to revitalize connections between law and other disciplines).
According to Stevens, Harvard had the greatest influence on other university)afliliated law
school curricula during this time, see id. at 35-72, and the standard "core curriculum" of the
1920s, developed under Harvard's influence, included neither comparative nor international
law. See STEVENS, supra, at 41 n.49; but cf. id. at 49 n.43 (noting that Yale offered secondyear
lectures on international law, comparative jurisprudence, Roman law, ecclesiastical law and po-
litical economy). Intellectual changes in the law also may have played a role in the decline of
comparative and international course requirements and offerings relative to other parts of the
legal curriculum. With the decline of natural law and its more universal approach to law's con-
tent and the rise of positivism as a basic jurisprudential outlook, it would not be surprising for
legal educators who view law as the command of a legitimate sovereign to believe that law stu-
dents should concentrate on the decisions and laws of their own jurisdiction. Cf. L,PNA. su-
pra, at 77 (linking Austin's positivism to Langdell's development of the case method).
As one moves on in the twentieth century, the tremendous developments in public law and
the rise of "functionalism" and of legal realism, bore a complex relationship to law school cur-
ricula in international and comparative public law. Stevens quotes a description of law school
curricula in the late 1940s as being "fairly well standardized... [with] curricula.., fashioned
largely around the subjects in which the graduates of the school must be examined for admis-
sion to practice...." Id. at 210 (quoting ABA Survey of the Legal Profession in late 1940s). In
1948 only 35 percent of AALS member schools offered courses in international law see JOHN
KI'G GAMBLE, TEACHING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 1990s 121 (1992), and a smaller number
appear to have offered comparative law, see Joseph Dainow, Teading Methods for Comparatue
Law, 3J. LEGAL EDUC. 388, 395 (1951) (stating that "as many as 26" law schools were then offer-
ing comparative law out of the then 107 AALS members reported by Warren Seavcy, ITte Assn of
American Law School in Rerospect 3J. LEGAL EDL'C. 153, 168 (1950)). Yet, in the immediate post-
World War II era, many law schools showed renewed interest in courses on global issues, and in
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Even today, few if any require study of international or comparative
law, and while rates of enrollment in such courses appear to be on
the rise, they remain at some law schools a marginalized area of
study.
44
In his speech discussed earlier, Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested
that until after World War II, the only materials available to consult in
judicial constitutional decision-making were domestic; 4 thus in the
area of constitutional law, there were no other games in town. Per-
haps it is more accurate to say, however, that of foreign decisions that
might have been viewed as constitutional, few were seen as relevant to
topics addressed by U.S. courts." Indeed what judges viewed as avail-
comparative law. See STEVENS, supra, at 222 n.42 (noting postwar pressure at the larger schools
for emphasis on international and comparative law); see also GAMBLE, supra, at 123 (noting that
by the 1950s about 60 percent of law schools had some provision for international offerings);
LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REAuSM ATYALE 1927-1960, at 154 (1986) (noting increased offerings in
late 1940s in public and international law at Yale as reflecting the interest of Yale legal realists in
social policy). As early as the 1920s, some legal realists at Columbia had urged a "broad concep-
tion ofjurisprudence as encompassing legal philosophy, ancient law, legal history and compara-
tive law," and expanded electives in comparative law. See KALMAN, supra, at 72. In 1949-50, Co-
lumbia University adopted a plan that required students to take minimum numbers of hours in
five subject groups, requirements that included at least two hours from a group including in-
ternational and comparative law and the legal profession. See STEVENS, supra, at 224 n.52. Har-
vard, in the 1950s, expanded its offerings in international law and comparative law. SeeARTHUR
E. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD: A HISTORY OF IDEAS AND MEN, 1817-1967, at 332-36
(1967). In the postwar period, McDougal and Lasswell offered a course at Yale on "The World
Community and Law," investigating "the conditions under which the peoples of the world can
be brought to a fuller consciousness and understanding of their interdependence so that they
would reshape their institutions accordingly." KALMAN, supra, at 181. Yet, the McDougal-
Lasswell approach to law as policy science had less influence elsewhere than might have been
expected. See id at 184-85; STEVENS, supra, at 265-66.
.. For a survey of international law teaching in the United Stated and Canada in the early
1990s, and a description of other surveys of international law offerings, see GAMBLE, supra note
43, at 1-37, 118-25, 134-39 (demonstrating long concern by internationalist scholars about offer-
ings and enrollments in international law courses, and showing that by early 1990s, more than
95% of law schools had such offerings but that there had been much less growth in the per-
centage of students enrolling in such courses, from 25% in 1912 to 45% in 1991). I am aware
of no U.S. law school that currently requires students to complete a course in comparative or
international law to earn aJ.D. degree. According to the on-line course catalogues of the Uni-
versity of California at Berkeley, University of Chicago, Columbia, Cornell, Duke, Georgetown,
Harvard, Michigan, New York University, the University of Pennsylvania, Stanford, Virginia, and
Yale, for instance, the schools offer many courses in international and comparative law, but do
not require study in those fields. (A list of citations to these on-line catalogues as of March 9,
1999 is on file with U. PA.J. CONST. L.). See also GAMBLE, supra note 43, at 4, 22, 123 (stating
that the "survey course in public international law.., is never required," in contrast to the year
1912, when 25 percent of U.S. law schools required a course in international law).
SeeRehnquist, supra note 12, at 411-12.
46 In evaluating Rehnquist's analysis, bear in mind that by the 1880's the Canadian Supreme
Court and the Privy Council in London were issuing decisions interpreting the power-allocating
clauses of the British North America Act [BNA], the first Canadian constitution, adopted in
1867. By 1949, Canada's Supreme Court was exercising final jurisdiction over questions arising
under the BNA, an Act that largely addressed allocations of power between the national and
provincial governments, but which also addressed some minority religious and linguistic issues.
See DALE GIBSON, THE LAW OF THE CHARTER: GENERAL PRINCIPLES 6-8 (1986); RICHARD E.
JOHNSTON, THE EFFECT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ON FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN AUSTRALIA,
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able and relevant may itself reflect "exceptionalist" understandings of
the U.S. Constitution.
Since World War II, a number of constitutional courts, perhaps
most prominently the German Federal Constitutional Court, have
developed important bodies of jurisprudence addressing constitu-
tional issues similar to those presented in the United States; of these,
only a small number are routinely available in English. Furthermore,
in those countries that have developed constitutions and constitu-
tional court decisions, the constitutions themselves are typically the
product of the latter part of the century. These constitutions are of-
ten longer than, and include provisions different from those of U. S.
Constitution. Understanding the constitutional context of foreign
decision-making is a daunting task, made no less so by the length
and, in some respects, unfamiliarity of the basic constitutional texts.
Finally, important differences exist between the U.S. constitutional
system and those of other leading producers of English-accessible
CN ¢ADA AND THE UNrnD STATES (1969). Moreover, Australia began generating constitutional
decisions on federalism issues in the early years of this century. For evidence of academic atten-
tion to Australia's early constitutional developments, see Charles Grone HainesJuduzal intrpre-
tation of the Constitution Act of Australia, 30 HARV. L REv. 597 (1917). In the 1930s and 1940s,
Justice Frankfurter referred to Canadian and Australian decisions in cases involving intergov-
ernmental immunities. See supra note 4 (discussing Frankfurter's dissenting and concurring
opinions in U.S. v. Allegheny and Graves v. New York ex rel. OKeefe, respectively). It thus seems
overly simple to suggest that it has not been until recently that there was a sufficient body of
constitutional decisions from other courts that could have been helpful to U.S. courts.
However, whether the federal systems of these three countries are so analogous that deci-
sions in one sytem bear directly on the corct result in another, as Frankfurter suggested, see
supra note 4, is somewhat doubtful. While all three nations were designed to have federal s)--
tems, Canada's federation was designed, in the heat of the U.S. Civil War, to establish a stronger
national government than that of the United States, an intention clearly frustrated by decisions,
led by the Privy Council, substantially restricting the scope of national power. See generally,
PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LiW OF CANADA 97-112 (3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter HOGG,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA]. Although Australia's federalist arrangements were more
closely modeled on those of the United States, the specific constitutional allocations of power to
the federal and provincial governments in both Canada and Australia differ from those of the
U.S. Constitution in some significant ways. Canada, for example, allocates criminal law entirely
to its national legislative competence. See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act 1867) pt. VI § 91(27).
In Australia, the national government has power to make laws for marriage, divorce and cus-
tody. SeeAUSTL CONST. Acr § 51 (.xxi), (xxii). Yet, in Canada, Australia, and the United States
there are more general issues of federalism in constitutional adjudication, on which wisdom is
not likely to be localized exclusively in one country's jurisprudence. For instance, on whether
enumerated federal powers should be construed broadly in favor of strong central power, or
more narrowly in order to preserve realms of provincial or state power, compare Attozey Cn.
for Ont. v. Attorney Gen. for Can. [1896] A.C. 348 (Privy Council reverses Canadian Supreme
Court to hold that federal power to "regulate" trade did not include power to "prohibit- trade)
and Rex v. Barger (1908) 6 C.LR. 41, 78 (implied prohibition doctrine in Australia) with Umted
States v. Daly, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (holding that power to regulate commerce includes power
to prohibit) and Missouri v. Holland 252 U.S. 416, 433-34 (1920) (dismissing "inisible radia-
tions" from powers reserved to states as constraints on federal treaty power). Having said all
this, Chief Justice Rehnquist's point about the rapid development of constitutional law since
World War II in other nations is widely shared. See MAURO CGPELLETrl & WILMIM COHE.N ,
COMPARATvE CONSTITUTIONAL Lw 13-16 (1979) (noting the explosive growth of constitutions
andjudicial review since World War II).
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opinions (for example, the rules against "abstract" review under the
"case or controversy" regime), as well as in the style and accessibility
of opinions written in other constitutional systems.1
7
Some of the reasons for resistance to comparative constitutional
learning, however, are in the process of changing. Interest in inter-
national and comparative courses is on the rise, as law practice be-
comes more globalized. Availability of foreign decisions is increasing.
Likewise, the rate of U.S. research in and publication on issues of
comparative constitutionalism is increasing, as this symposium illus-
trates. 48 And U.S. judges are participating in a variety of international
organizations and educational programs which promote exposure to
other constitutional systems.
47 Thus, for example, decisions of the French Conseil Constitutionnel, even when trans-
lated, are sometimes difficult for those accustomed to U.S. opinions to understand, with terse
paragraphs succeeding each other in a not always easy to follow narrative. For discussion of
French judicial discourse, see Mitchel de S.-O.- I'E. Lasser, 'Lit Theory' Put to the Test: A Compara-
tive Literary Analysis of American Judicial Tests and French Judicial Discourse, 111 HARV. L. REV. 689
(1998); Mitchel de S.-O.-I'E. Lasser, Judicial (Self-) Portraits: Judicial Discourse in the French Legal
System, 104 YALE L.J. 1325 (1995). Reliance on treatises by legal scholars is far more common
in European systems and thus the materials of comparison and discussion themselves appear
unfamiliar. For a recent example of the attitude of some U.S. judges to treatises and law review
articles, see Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994) (noting in a tone of implicit criti-
cism that "Justice Stevens' dissent relies upon a law review article for" a certain proposition).
48 A LEXIS search for law review articles referring to the key language in Section 1 of the
Canadian Charter ("demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society") from 1990
through 1997 yielded 69 articles in U.S. lawjournals. A LEXIS search of U.S. Supreme Court
opinions for references to the Canadian Supreme Court yielded 21 cases (not counting one
disbarment petition), of which seven were decided after 1980; only one of these, Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), involved reference to the Canadian Supreme Court's decisions
in a majority opinion on a constitutional issue.
4 My sense is that in the last ten years, there has been an increase in U.S. judges' travel
abroad to meet with their counterparts, and likewise a substantial influx in the other direction,
fueled in some measure by the emergence of new regimes in Eastern and Central Europe and
the constitutional revolution in South Africa. Review by the author of financial disclosure
statements of the U.S. Supreme Court justices between 1992-97 (available on request through
the Administrative Office of the U.S. courts) reveals that most of the justices reported reim-
bursement for some international travel for educational purposes during this time period, and
several justices report regular international trips for educational purposes in the summer. As
further evidence of increasing opportunities for judicial interchange, consider the following
examples. In October, 1994, the U.S.Judicial Conference established a permanent Committee
on International Judicial Relations, designed to review and assist exchange programs offered to
representative foreign legal systems and their counterparts in the United States. See Reports of
the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United StatesJudicial Conference Comm. on
Int'l Judicial Relations 36, 60 (Sept. 20, 1993); see also Report of the Ad Hoc Comm. on Int'l
Judicial Relations 4-5 (Sept. 1993) (in recommending that committee become permanent,
notes interest in international judicial relations and judicial interest in "education on civil law
systems ofjustice and on the interaction between federal jurisprudence and international trea-
ties and conventions"). In June, 1995, the First Worldwide Common LawJudiciary Conference
was held in Williamsburg, Virginia and Washington D.C. SeeJustices, Judges from Common Law
Countries Meet in Williamsburg and Washington, INT'LJUDICIAL OBSERVER, September, 1995, at 1.
The second such conference was held in May, 1997, in Washington, D.C., and included U.S.
federal judges and representatives from ten common law nations. See Judges from Ten Common
Law Countries Meet in Washington for Five Day Conference, INT'LJUDICIAL OBSERVER,June, 1997, at
1. In October, 1995, the Organization of Supreme Courts of the Americas was created as a
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Yet, accessibility and interest alone do not fully explain the am-
bivalence about looking to other constitutional systems for illumina-
tion of shared constitutional problems. Other divides, and reasons
for caution in borrowing constitutional ideas from one system to an-
other, are likely to remain. The differences between the U.S. Consti-
tution and the constitutions of other western democracies are sub-
stantial, not only in the organization of the court systems that resolve
constitutional questions, but also in the relatively unusual nature of
the U.S. "presidential" system of allocating executive and legislative
power. The interplay between these allocations of power and the sys-
tem of federalism in the United States makes analogies to any of the
other major constitutional systems complex and difficult. And differ-
ences in history, culture, population composition and distribution,
political parties and voting systems, further and substantially compli-
cate the process even of understanding the operation of other consti-
tutional systems, let alone "borrowing" from them.
One difficulty in using comparative constitutional study to identify
areas for potential "borrowing" is in determining when foreign con-
stitutional law reflects alternative ways of understanding familiar con-
cepts and problems, such as due process of law, or enumerated and
limited powers, that give rise to interpretive questions. Comparative
study can yield insights into the sense of "false necessity" internal to
one legal system. As Justice Breyer argued in Printz v. United States,"'
given that some countries find it important to safeguard the right of
sub-national units to administer national law, it is hard to conclude
that, in order to have a successful and continuing federal division of
powers, a national government must be prohibited from requiring
sub-national units to do so. At these moments of possible insight,
however, one is faced with the harder problem of distinguishing false
necessities for a given constitutional system from aspects of the system
that may be true necessities in light of the (some would say inevitable)
interdependencies of the parts of the whole?' For example, had Jus-
tice Scalia responded on the merits to Justice Breyer's reference to
the structure of other federal systems, he might have argued that
other differences between German and U.S. federalisms preclude re-
liance on Germany's emphasis on the 15.nder administration of fed-
eral law in determining what the U.S. rule should be. The symbolic
meaning of sub-national administration of federal law in Germany
permanent institutional link between the judiciahies of the Americas, with a focus on judicial
education. See Justices, Judges from Across Western Hemisplure Assemble, Create Cartyfor New Orgarn-
zation of Supreme Courts, INT'LJUDICIAL OBSERV., January, 1997, at 1. And te Fourth Interna-
tional judicial Conferences forJustices of Supreme Courts and Constitutional Courts %%s held
in 1996 at the Federal Judicial Center in Washington, D.C. S&e Major IntlJudL Conf. to MLt nm
Washinton, INT'LJUD. OBSERVER, Sept. 1996, at 1.
5 See521 U.S. 898,976-78 (1997) (BreyerJ. dissenting).
51 For a thoughtful theoretical elaboration, see Mark Tushnet, Rturning IlSth Interest: Obvr-
vations on Some Putative Benefits of Studying Constitutional Lau. 1 U. PA.J. Co.xs. L 325 (1998).
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differs substantially from that in the United States." So, too, do the
mechanisms for lUnder influence in the national legislative process:
members of the lUnder governments sit in the Bundesrat to exercise
constitutionally-secured and judicially-enforceable political powers
over legislation that the linder will then have to administer;13 this
power differs substantially from the less direct influences state gov-
ernments have upon the U.S. Congress and may be a structural pro-
tection against undue burdens of administration in Germany that is
lacking in the U.S constitutional system.
A final obstacle to constitutional borrowing may be worth noting,
one that is reflected in the self-consciously normative mode of analy-
sis found in many Canadian and German decisions. Perhaps because
they are far more recently adopted, decisions about these constitu-
tions are often less concerned with original intentions than some of
the current decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.5 German constitu-
tional court decisions often begin their reasoning with a basic, fun-
damental norm, not particularly tied to a specific constitutional text,
and proceed in their reasoning from the abstract principle to the de-
52 In Germany subnational administration of federal laws is understood as one of the rights
of the Lnder and as part of a relationship of trust among the federal and subnational govern-
ments; in the United States, it is perceived as a federal imposition on the states. See sources
cited infra note 53.
5 See generally DONALD KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 69-75, 82-83, 96-102 (2d ed. 1997); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 61-66 (1994). Note that unlike members of the U.S.
Senate, who are popularly elected to that position, the members of the Bundesrat are represen-
tatives of the lUnder governments. The German Basic Law also contemplates "financial equali-
zation" laws (with the consent of the Bundesrat), designed to "ensure a reasonable equalization
of the financial disparity of the lUnder, due account being taken of the financial capacity and
requirements of the municipalities...." BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY,
ArL 107 (d) (Official translation revised March 1995). The Basic Law specifies that eligible
LUnder are those "whose per capita revenue from Land taxes and from income and corporation
tax is below the average of all the lander combined." Id. at Art. 107(1). These features, as well,
may affect evaluation of the significance of the role of 15.nder administration of federal law in
Germany.
In light of distinctive features of each system, similar questions could be raised about the
relevance of Canadian or Australian federalism decisions. For example, in neither Australia nor
Canada did the states or provinces (at least through mid century) preserve as much autonomy
and power to raise their own taxes as did those of the United States, but rather relied on nego-
tiated payments from the federal government to provide the subnational units with real budg-
ets. See generallyJOHNSTON, supra note 46, at 119-57. There may be reciprocal relationships be-
tween greater national power over taxes and more restrictive interpretations of regulatory
powers that ought to caution against ready borrowing of doctrine concerning the latter in a sys-
tern that has preserved more fiscal autonomy to its subnational units.
5 The obvious connection between chronology and originalist interpretation is that the far-
ther away from original drafting one is, the less consensus, the less in the way of shared under-
standings will exist about what was and was not meant, and the more there will be to argue
about. For elaboration of this, and other less obvious connections, see Eivind Smith, Introduc.
tion to CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE UNDER OLD CONSTITUTIONS (Eivind Smith, ed. 1995) and
other essays in this collection, especially those by Francis Delp~re, Frank Michelman, and Mi-
chel Troper.
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cision at hand. U.S. constitutional decisions are more likely to begin
with a precedent, or a statement of facts.57
We in the United States are in a long-continuing period of unease
over the Court's authority as an institution to assert bold principles or
normative values. Those constitutional courts that speak and inter-
pret on behalf of younger constitutional orders, however, may feel
themselves to be speaking to a different generation of constitutional
problems than the U.S. Court faces. For one thing, the judicial re-
view functions of newer constitutional courts are often expressly pro-
vided for in their constitutional documents. The interpretive difficul-
ties for a court faced with an old and seldom-amended document
differ from those of constitutional courts populated by persons for
whom the drafting of the basic law is within their personal memories,
or those of their immediate teachers."s In societies with newer consti-
tutions, there may be broader areas of consensus, born of knowledge
of the process of constitution-making, that function to constrain, or
to legitimize decisions in ways not available to the U.S. Court. None-
theless, as the Canadian experience demonstrates, issues of the le-
gitimacy and the scope ofjudicial activism and of deference to legisla-
tive judgments can emerge early even in new constitutional systems."
These controversies illuminate, if nothing else, the tensions between
democratic self-government, on the one hand, and judicially-
enforced adherence to constitutional norms, on the other, that have
concerned U.S. constitutionalists.
See, &g., 1975 German Abortion Decision, translated in DO.ALD P. Ko.t.%IERS, THE
CONSTuTIONALJURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GER.L,,.%v 349 (1989) (analyzing
abortion issue in light of fundamental value of protection of human life). Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (analyzing abortion in light of history, practice and precedent).
57 In part this may be due to the common law feature of constitutional adjudication so apty
described in David Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Adjudication, 63 U. CIIL L REV. 877
(1996).
SeeJOHNSTON, supra note 46, at 239 (arguing that earlier interpretations of die BMA by
the Canadian Supreme Court were more receptive to national power than those of the Privy
Council because "members of the early Court were judges for whom federation had been a per-
sonal experience, and they knew well the purposes for which the union had been consum-
mated"). See also PatrickJ. Monahan, The Charter Then and Now, in PROTECriNG RIGHTS AND
FREEDOts 105 (Philip Bryden, et. al., eds., 1994) (arguing that public debate and lobb)ing over
the Canadian Charter in the period 1980-82 had effect of sending message tojudges to take the
document seriously as a constraint on legislative action).
59 Compare DON STUART, CHARTERJUSTICE IN CANADIAN CRIlm%,L LW 18-19 (2d ed. 1996)
(criticizing inconsistency and laxness of the Canadian Court's recent decisions applying the
proportionality test as a cause for concern) andJamie Cameron, The Past, Present, and Future of
ExpresiveFreedom Under the Charter, 35 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 1.55, 67 (1997) (criticizing subjectiv-
ity of Canadian Court's section 1 analysis in free expression cases and arguing for a return to
fundamental assumption of Oakes that any infringement of Charter rights must be taken seri-
ously under Section 1) with Monahan, supra note 58. at 117 (praising the Court's approach as
deferential and "resist[ing] the temptation to install itself as a kind of 'super legislature") and
Pierre Blache, The Criteria ofJustification under Oakes: Too Mudh Sevrrit Generated Through Forw.at-
ism, 20 MANITOBA LJ. 437, 438, 450 (1991) (arguing that the Court has engaged in "prudent
revisionism" of the Oakes test and is better in moving towards more open balancing).
60 See David Beatty, Law and Politics, 44 A.iM. J. COMP. L 131 (1996) (arguing that constitu-
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B. Why we should abandon ambivalence
as to the study of comparative constitutional materials
Having said all this, let me suggest one reason, among many oth-
ers,6' that we should not be ambivalent about learning more about
constitutional decisions and practices outside the United States -
whatever use we may or may not make of this knowledge.2
Comparison is inevitable. We cannot help but draw on compari-
sons with other systems in understanding and giving meaning to our
own. At least in the late twentieth century, news and communication
media, as well as professional journals, bombard those who hold
power or authority in the United States legal community with infor-
mation about what is happening not only in the United States, but in
many countries around the world and in international legal regimes.
When Justice Scalia asserts that U.S. federalism is uniquely American,
he is making an implicit comparison to other systems and asserting
that there is no other system like that of the United States. When the
majority in Fong Yue Ting v. United States invoked the universal prac-
tice of sovereigns, as well as when the dissenters invoked the irrele-
vance of foreign practice to U.S. constitutional law, each was making
an implicit comparison. 6" We cannot wholly prevent ourselves from
being influenced by what we think we know about other countries -
in thinking about how rigorous are the standards for impeachment,
whether racial distinctions by the government are ever permitted, or
whether hate speech should be criminally punished or judicially pro-
tected6 - what we think we know about the world forms part of the
tional scholars in many countries perceive a tension between popular sovereignty and judicial
enforcement of entrenched rights). Some qualified praise emerges in the Canadian literature
for the Court's steering a middle course between these two (at times) contradictory values. See,
e.g., Andre LaJoie and Henry Quillinan, The Supreme Court Judges' Views of the Role of the Courts in
the Application of the Charter, in PROTECTING RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS, supra note 58, at 101 (sug-
gesting that the role of the Chief Judge in applying proportionality review under section 1 of
Charter is to maintain formal appearance of unified, objective approach to Charter interpreta-
tion even in the face of different interpretations of facts).
61 See Mark Tushnet, The Possibility of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225
(1999) for a discussion of a number of other possible benefits of comparative constitutional
stud.
The "we" here refers to those who purport to speak with authority or power on the char-
acter and content of U.S. constitutional law (whether judges, legislators, lawyers, teachers, stu-
dents or citizens.
Compare Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893) (implicitly comparing
the powers of other nations by holding that it is an "inherent and inalienable right of every sov-
ereign and independent nation" to exclude or expel aliens) with id. at 737 (Brewer, J. dissent-
ing) ("governments of other nations have elastic powers - ours is fixed and bounded by a writ-
ten constitution") and id. at 757-58 (Field, J. dissenting) (arguing that the United States "takes
nothing" from the cruel and barbaric practices of Europe).
To elaborate one of these examples: In the recent controversy concerning the possible
impeachment of President Clinton, some have advanced arguments that part of the reason why
the standard for impeachment needs to be very high is because the U.S. system is not one of
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lattice work of assumptions and beliefs that constitute, "our tradi-
tions," "common sense," or "contemporary understandings"."'
My point in referring to "what we think we know" is that we im-
plicitly think we know many things about what is "necessary" to make
the U.S. Constitution work the way we think it "should" or "%as sup-
posed to" and some of the assumptions on which this knowledge rests
have to do with what we are and are not supposed to be. A basic and
still valuable lesson from Freud is that becoming aware of our own
experiences, assumptions and beliefs - making what is obscure visible
and what is latent manifest - enables us to use our rational, analytical
skills to make better sense out of what we should do in the future.6
Whether or not we conclude on reasoned reflection that practices
elsewhere suggest answers for U.S. constitutional questions, we are
more likely to be able to monitor and control how much our assump-
tions about foreign views and practices influence our thinking if we
become aware of those assumptions - and this is a benefit of actually
studying comparative constitutional law.
In sum, comparison is inevitable. In formulating answers to U.S.
constitutional questions, an implicit part of our arguing about and
deciding these questions has to do with assumptions of what U.S.
constitutionalism is about and what it requires; and this analysis in-
volves an implicit comparison with other forms of constitutionalism.
If comparison is (or is becoming) inevitable, then comparison should
be conscious, knowing, well-informed, and reasoned.ee
parliamentary governance. The comparison may be illuminating, but it is also more complex
than may at first appear. The first level of analysis would note that in a parliamentary system, if
the Prime Minister does not survive a confidence vote, new elections are required and the peo-
ple then have the chance to express their will at the polls. Under the U.S. presidential system.
by contrast, elections are held at the end of fixed 4 year terms, which the elected President
serves out unless he is found to have committed an impeachable offense. If the President is
removed from office by impeachment, there are no new elections held but the office is taken
over by someone elected or appointed to a different position. The anti-democratic possibilities
of impeachment, therefore, argue for a high standard for defining impeachable offenses. Sec-
ond, note that in a parliamentary system with two or three strong political parties, the Prime
Minister will have the support of a majority party in the elected assembly, and thus may be less
likely to develop the kind of conflict with that body that is more common in a presidential sys-
tem, where a President may be from one party and the Congress dominated by another. If a
President has lost the confidence of a majority of the Congress and the people, without some
means to remove him from office, the country could be hobbled in its governance. Some might
argue, then, that the standard of impeachment should not be set at so high a level as to make
impossible effective governance. Third, note the importance of understanding the conse-
quences of different structures of executive-legislative relations and the number and nature of
political parties active on the national scene. Within the limits of a footnote the point is only
that comparisons can be illuminating but are very complex.
For an introduction to the literature on constitutional interpretation, see GEOFn"EV R.
STONE Er. AL., CONSTrrtTIONAL LAW 37-46, 785-95 (3d ed., 1996).
See ERRar.S WALLWORK, PSYCHOANALYSIS AND ETHIcs 64-65 (1991) (Freud's therapeutic
goal was to make ... unconscious hidden meanings 'articulate'" to increase patient's freedom).
Thus, as noted earlier, whenjustice Frankfurter invoked the similarity in federal structure
of Canada and Australia to the United States, he may well have been in error. &rz supra notes 4
and 46 (discussingJustice Frankfurter's reliance on Australian and Canadian decisions on in-
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III. PROPORTIONALITYAND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A brief look at the concept of "proportionality" in constitutional
law, both outside the United States and in recent U.S. Supreme Court
opinions, will illuminate some of the benefits (and limitations) of
comparative constitutional learning. Since 1994, the U.S. Supreme
Court has articulated a "proportionality" test in two different consti-
tutional fields.68 Most recently, in Flores, the Court invoked propor-
tionality to measure the constitutionality of exercises of Congress's
Section 5 powers under the Fourteenth Amendment. 69 Specifically,
the Court there held that Congress's use of its remedial powers under
Section 5 must be proportional to or congruent with the constitu-
tional harm sought to be remedied, and held that a recently-enacted
federal statute was unconstitutional because it failed the test of pro-
portionality. While no reference is made to support the Court's invo-
cation of considerations of proportionality, no Justice explicitly dis-
sented from the majority's use of the concept.70 Yet, the most
immediate scholarly responses to the Hores proportionality test were
negative, treating Fores' invocation of "proportionality" as a novel, in-
determinate and unwise innovation.7' This response, from a perspec-
tergovernmental tax issues and the possible inaccuracy of his assumption of similarity). Moreo-
ver, as I discuss below, the Breyer-Scalia interchange in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898
(1997) suggests the importance of broad knowledge of other systems, as well as of their particu-
lar structures, for evaluating the "transplantability" of practices from elsewhere; it also suggests
the importance of understanding the context of which such practices are always only a part. See
supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that exercises of Congress's
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment must be proportional to constitutional
violations sought to be prevented or remedied); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 388-91
(1994) (holding that, where the nature and costs of a condition for permission to make
changes to real property are not roughly proportional to the nature and impact of the change
progosed, an unconstitutional "taking" of property may be found).
See Rores, 521 U.S. at 518. Section 5 authorizes Congress by all appropriate measures to
enforce the provisions of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, including its guarantee of
equal protection and due process. Acting under Section 5, Congress has, for example, enacted
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, upheld in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). For
discussion of the statute at issue in Rores, see infra text accompanying notes 184-188.
70 See Rores, 521 U.S. at 544 (O'ConnorJ., dissenting) (agreeing with the majority that scope
of Congress's Section 5 powers turn on congruence and proportionality between injury to be
prevented or remedied and means adopted to that end, but arguing that Smith v. Employment
Division, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), was wrongly decided); see id. at 565 (Souter,J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that, in light of doubts about the Smith, the case should be reargued). The closest any
member of the Court came to questioning the proportionality test, albeit implicitly, was a short,
cryptic dissenting opinion by Justice Breyer. See id. at 566 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that
he joined all but one paragraph ofJustice O'Connor's dissent - the paragraph summarized in
the parenthetical above - and reserving his own views on the proper method of Section 5
analysis).
See David Cole, The Value of Seeing Things Differently, 1997 Sup. CT. REV. 31, 47 (noting that
proportionality standards "provide little if any principled guidance");John T. Noonan, Jr., Relig-
ious Liberty at Stake, 84 VA. L. REv. 459, 470-71 (1998) (criticizing proportionality test as "ex-
traordinary," unsupported by precedent and inconsistent with McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
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five internal to U.S. constitutional decisions, is perhaps not surpris-
ing.' U.S. constitutional law does not ordinarily and explicitly resort
to the idea of proportionality as a measure of constitutionality - even
in the Eighth Amendment area,n where the constitutional text seems
to call for application of the idea of proportionality, 7 an idea that was
developed in early legal writings about criminal punishments.7m Pro-
fessor Stuntz has recently suggested that the failure to develop pro-
portionality analysis in constitutional review of criminal law issues is
due to the fact that such review involves decisions of inherently po-
litical, rather than legal issues:
There is no nonarbitrary way to arrive at the proper legal
rules, no way to get to sensible bottom lines by something
that looks and feels like legal analysis. Wh'lether propor-
Wheat) 316, 421 (1819), which should serve as a guide to Congress's general powers). For
other critiques of Fors'proportionality standard, see Douglas Laycock. Coneeplual Gulfs m City
of Boeme v. Flores, 39 WM & MARY L REV. 743, 770-71 (1998); Michael W. McConnell. Cam-
ment: Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boeme v. Flores, Ill l-Lv. L REv. 153.
166-67 (1997) [hereinafter McConnell, Institutions and nte reration). For more favorable
treatment of F/ora'proportionality analysis, sce eg., David P. Currie, RFRA, 39 W.%I & .M-h L
REv. 637, 640 (1998) ("In demanding a congruence and proportionality between the injury to
be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end, the Court in Fores set forth an
attractive test that it would no longer blindly accept untenable congressional pretenses that a
particular measure was 'appropriate' to enforce the Civil War amendments or "necessary and
proper' to protect interstate and foreign commerce") (internal citation omitted); Marci Hamil-
ton, City of Boeme v. Flores, A LandmadrforSrturalAnasis, 39 WMt & MLRY L REV. 699, 712-
14 (1998).
,2 Nor is it surprising that scholars have noted the apparently increased rigor of proportion-
ality review of congressional action as compared with earlier test of mere "rationality," and dis-
agreed whether this is a good thing. Se eg., McConnell, Institutions and Inteipraraton. supra
note 71, at 166-67 (describing proportionality and congruence as more stringent than approach
epitomized in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653 (1966)); Stephen Gardbaum. The Federal-
ism Implications of Flores, 39 WM & MARY L RE%% 665, 677 n.52 (1998) ('The Farm majorin ...
presumed... that Congress enacted RFRA with the legitimate aim of enforcing the Free Exer-
cise clause as interpreted in Smith and employed the proportionality test to determine whether
the means - imposing the compelling interest standard on the states - were properly related to
it."); Hamilton, supra note 71, at 712-14 (approving proportionality test as one designed to
make Congress perform its duties reasonably well); Laycock. supra note 71, at 770-71 (criticizing
proportionality test for allowing judicial "second-guessing of [questions ofl degree in the inter-
pretation of its delegated powers").
SeeHarmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) ("We conclude [that] the Eighth Amnend-
ment contains no proportionality guarantee.").
W4 See William Stmtz, Criminal Procedure and CriminalJustize, 107 'I'. Lj. 1. 72-73 (1997)
("The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments could plausibly be read to imply a propor-
tionality principle for sentencing....").
See, e.g., BECCARIA, OF CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS SECTION 23 (1764), translated in Jane
Grugson (1996) (asserting that punishments should be graded to correspond with the gravit', of
the crime); see also H.L.A. Hart, Prolegomenon to te Pinciples of Punishwit, in PuNISII.%E"I"r -VMD
RESPONSmILiTY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LMW 1, 14-15 (1968) (arguing a utiliLarian view
that punishment should be distributed, in part, in proportion to the seeriti of the offense.
Early U.S. state constitutions included provisions requiring that penalties be 'proportioned to
the nature of the offense." See, e.g., N.H. CONST. of 1783 (cited in ANDREV' VON I-lSsit:. DOI\ t
JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 67 (1976)).
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tionality review [of criminal sentences] is lodged in appel-
late or trial courts, the only way to do it is to do it, to decide
that this sentence is too great but not that one. There is no
metric for determining right answers, no set of analytical
tools that defines what a given sentence ought to be ....
Similarly, [with respect to the definition of substantive
crimes] heightened mens rea requirements for overbroad
crimes beg the question of which crimes are overbroad.
Special culpability rules for, say, mail fraud would inevitably
rest on a judicial judgment that mail fraud is badly defined,
that Congress criminalized more than it should have.7
Thus, Professor Stuntz suggests, review for proportionality would
"amount[] not just to open-ended judicial regulation... but also to
arbitrary judicial regulation, regulation that produces outcomes un-
tethered to any definable legal principle.,
77
What is striking here is the degree to which, in the United States,
proportionality itself is not seen as a "definable legal principle."78 Yet,
in Canada, whose court decisions are readily available in English,7 9
proportionality is a basic tool for analyzing the constitutionality of
measures claimed to violate individual rights.8 1 Likewise, proportion-
ality is a widespread concept in European law. The idea of propor-
tionality is one that inheres in many conceptions of justice and just
82lawmaking, and is embodied in some of the articulated "means-
7 See Stuntz, supra note 74, at 73.
Id.; see also Noonan, supra note 71, at 470-71 ("Proportion is not a criterion. It is hard to
see how proportion would work as a criterion for civil legislation. It is difficult to see how pro-
portion worked in Boerne."). But cf Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976) (arguing that dis-
parity between Fourth Amendment errors of police and windfall to guilty defendant of exclud-
ing evidence "is contrary to the idea of proportionality that is essential to the concept of
justice"). Note that FAores is not the first use of "proportionality" as a measure of legislative
power in the 1990s. See, Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (holding that stan-
dard of "rough proportionality" between the costs of the activity for which a permit is sought,
and the benefits conferred by the permit should be used to determine whether a regulatory
condition constitutes a governmental "taking" requiringjust compensation).
78 For a very different evaluation of proportionality principles in the public law of Germany,
France and the European Union, see NICHOLAS ENiiuou, THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY
IN EUROPEAN LAW: A COMPAATvE STUDY 1 (1996) ("Proportionality embodies a basic concept
of fairness which has strengthened the protection of individual rights at both the national and
supranational level." ); see also DAVID BEAY, CONsTrrUTIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
(1995) (arguing that all constitutional principles, transnationally, can be understood as elabo-
ration of the core principles of rationality and proportionality).
9 Canadian cases can be accessed through LEXIS under the library name "Canada."
80 See infra text accompanying notes 88-105.
81 See EMILIOU, supra note 78, at 134 (stating that between 1955 and late 1994, "proportional-
ity" had been argued by litigants or invoked by the European Court ofJustice in over 500 hun-
dred cases).
8 See supra note 75. For state constitutions that continue to require that penalties be pro-
portional to the nature of the offense, see IND. CONST. art. I, § 16 (Bill of Rights) (1998); ME.
CONsT. art. 1, § 9 (1998); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 15 (1997); N.H. CONST. pt I, art. 18 (1997);
OREGON CONsT. art. I, § 16 (1997).
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ends" tests deployed in U.S. constitutional law.s
Proportionality tests offer both advantages and risks that can be
analyzed, in part, on the basis of comparative experience, which has
largely been in the arena of individual rights. In Section A below, I
briefly describe Canada's development of the concept of proportion-
ality in its constitutional law and compare a Canadian and a U.S. case
on "hate speech" to illuminate salient differences between the Cana-
dian "proportionality" test and the more categorical form of constitu-
tional analysis employed here. Although there is much that is attrac-
tive about the Canadian analyses, thoughtful reflection suggests that
the prospect of a successful "transplant" of the Canadian approach to
the United States is uncertain at best.
Section B then sets forth in more detail Flores' use of proportional-
ity, and suggests that proportionality as a tool for resolving federal-
ism-based challenges to federal power should be understood some-
what differently than "proportionality" analysis where individual
constitutional rights are at stake. In the federalism arena, "propor-
tionality" tests may have the more limited role of being a surrogate
for identifying the validity of congressional purpose and containing
an otherwise uncontainable federal power to obliterate state govern-
ments' abilities to function as independent sources of power. Com-
parative experience also suggest, however, that in the United States
such federalism-based forms of review of national action should be
conducted only with a high degree of deference to legislative findings
and power. Whether readers agree with this conclusion or not, I
hope also to show that the U.S. Supreme Court's constitutional deci-
sions, and analyses of them, would be improved ifjudges, lawyers and
scholars were more widely aware of the tools and techniques of other
constitutional courts.
83 Rigorous versions of proportionality tests bear some resemblance to the requirement of
.compelling state interest" tests in equal protection analysis, se, e.g., United States v. Paradise.
480 U.S. 149 (1987) (upholding race-conscious remedial order that fifty percent of promotions
go to black officers, on grounds that the remedy was "narrowly tailored" to serve a 'compelling
government purpose" in light of the ineffectiveness of alternatives. flexibility and limited dura-
tion of the relief, and its limited adverse impact on third parties), and the standard for uphold-
ing discriminatory state regulation of commerce, see Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (up-
holding facially discriminatory ban on imported live baitfish because danger to native fish
populations was genuine and there was no less discriminatory alternative for screening poten-
tially diseased baitfish). See also Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983) (invalidating
as unduly burdensome on First Amendment rights a state law requiring independent candi-
dates to file for November ballot in March and stating that court must detehnine leitimacy
and strength" of state's assertedjustifications and "must also consider the extent to which those
[state] interests make it necessary to burden" plaintiffs' rights). The 'narrow tailoring' re-
quirement is at times articulated as part of the Canadian proportionality test. embodying the
idea that when a fundamentally important right is at issue, intrusions on the exercise of that
right must be proportioned both to the end being served and the harm being caused. &e, e.g.,
Thomson Newspapers v. Canada, 1998 DLR Lexs 399 (Supreme Court May 19. 1998) (finding
unconstitutional a law requiring a news blackout of reporting on any opinion polls within three
days of election as not narrowly tailored to achieve purpose of preventing reporting of neu, polls
without time for reflection and response).
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A. Canada's Constitution and the Oakes Test:
Proportionality as a Principle In Protecting Individual Rights
Canada adopted a rights-protecting constitution in 1982, The Ca-
nadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 4 The Charter begins with a
section that is both declaratory and limiting of the enforceability of
its subsequent provisions: "The Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject
only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstra-
bly justified in a free and democratic society." 85 The Canadian Su-
preme Court has construed this provision to mean that even ifa law is
found to violate some particular right set forth in the Charter, the law
can nonetheless be upheld if it is "demonstrably justified in a free
and democratic society. 8 Thus Charter claims typically are analyzed
with a generous interpretation of what the rights-protecting provi-
sions cover; 7 if an infringement of one of those provisions is found,
then the more important analysis often occurs under the rubric of
this Section 1 standard.
In analyzing this standard, the Canadian Supreme Court ("Cana-
dian Court") has held that two inquiries must be made: first, whether
the purpose of the governmental intrusion on the freedom or right is
legitimate and of sufficient importance to justifying limiting a right;s
second, whether the means chosen are proportional to the purpose -
(i) are they rationally connected to the objective, (ii) do they impair
the protected rights as little as possible,8 9 and (iii) are the effects of
84 See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms).
Id. at§ 1.
SeeR. v. Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 114.
87 See, e.g., Prostitution Reference Case [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123 (holding that solicitation of
prostitution is a form of freedom of expression under Charter Section 2 (b) infringed upon by a
criminal prohibition of soliciting, yet upholding the prohibition as reasonable and justified un-
der Section 1); R. v. Skinner [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1235 (same). For a critique of this kind of ap-
proach, see Peter W. Hogg, Interpreting the Charter of Rights: Generosity and Justification, 28
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 817 (1990) (arguing that a broad interpretation of rights cannot coexist
with stringent standards ofjustification and favoring narrow rights interpretation) [hereinafter
Hogg, Interpreting the Charter of Rights].
AsJustice Dickson explained in Oakes, 1 S.C.R. at 138, this "standard must be high in or-
der to ensure that objectives which are trivial or discordant with the principles integral to a free
and democratic society do not gain section 1 protection. It is necessary, at a minimum, that an
objective relate to concerns which are pressing and substantial in a free and democratic society
before it can be characterized as sufficiently important." (emphasis added).
89 In Oakes, the Court used language that seemed to invite a "least restrictive alternative"
standard of great severity. Critics noted how difficult it can be to meet that standard, given the
creativity of courts and lawyers in finding such alternatives. Within the year, however, the ap-
parent rigidity of the initial articulation was modulated in an opinion joined by the author of
Oakes. SeeR. v. Edward Books and Art, Ltd. [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, 772 (characterizing the inquiry
as whether it impairs freedoms as little as reasonably possible); Pamela A. Chapman, The Politics
ofJudging. Section I of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 24 OSGOODE HLXLL L. J. 867, 886,
889-90 (1987) (describing Edwards Books as a substantial softening of the Oakes standard).
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the measure generally proportional to the objective., These are the
inquiries of the so-called Oakes test.
This test of proportionality is used in a wide range of Canadian
constitutional adjudications that take place under a constitutional
delegation to the courts essentially to strike a balance between the
protection of Charter-identified rights and freedoms, on the one
hand, and the "demonstrably justified" claims of the government
consistent with a "free" and "democratic" society, on the other." Sec-
tion l's provisions were fairly widely understood to invite the Court to
make "moral and political" inquiries and judgments in resolving con-
stitutional questions.92
A significant number of cases in Canada apply the Oakes test of
proportionality to determine whether to uphold a law even though it
trenches in some way on basic rights and freedoms. The test does not
seem to be particularly associated with outcomes in favor of or against
the government position, unlike the "compelling interest" test of U.S.
equal protection jurisprudence. Some famous cases, like Oakes itself
(dealing with the presumption of innocence), the Canadian abortion
decision, and a recent decision concerning a national ban on to-
bacco advertising,9 have struck down laws that the government ar-
gued were sustainable under the proportionality test. In other areas,
the Canadian Court has sustained challenged statutes under the
Oakes test, including the hate speech statute challenged in Keegstra, a
mandatory retirement age,9 a ban on advertising directed at chil-
dren,97 and a "secular" one-day-a-week dosing law."
The Oakes test has been both praised and deplored by Canadian
constitutional scholars.9 Most scholars agree that the test has not
9D See Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. at 139. The test %as foreshadowed in a brief paragraph injustice
Dickson's opinion in R v. Big AL Drug Mart [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, but as fully articulated in
Oakes. Justice Dickson also noted that applying the proportionality test '%ill v'y depending on
the circumstances," and that "in each case courts will be required to balance the interests of
society with those of individuals and groups." Oakes, 1 S.C.R. at 138-39.
9' See Oakes, 1 S.C.R. at 138-39.
See William E. Conklin, Intrpa ng and Applying the Limitations Clause: An Ana4ys of Section
1, 1982,4 Sup. CT. L. REV. 75,75,87 (1982).
93 SeeR. v. Morgentaler [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30.
See RJR MacDonald, Inc. v. Canada [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199.
95 SeeR. v. Keegstra [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697. See also R. v. Butler [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452. 482, 494,
509 (sustaining pornography ban on publication whose "dominant characteristic.., is the un-
due exploitation of sex").
See McKinney v. University of Guelph [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229 (finding that mandatory retire-
ment ages were discriminatory under Section 15 butjustified under Section 1).
See Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 (upholding, under Section 1. a ban on
advertising directed at children under 13, despite its infringement upon Section 2 rights).
98 SeeR. v. Edwards Books and Art [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, 713 (upholding Swtday-closing law
under Section 1, despite fact that it limited freedom of religion).
Compare STUART, supra note 59, at 18 (criticizing Court's inconsistency): Cameron, supra
note 59, at 5 (criticizing Court's subjectivity); and Christopher M. Dassios & Clifton P. Prophet.
Charter Section 1: The Decline of Grand Unijfid Th ory and the Trend Tow'ards Deference in the Supreme
Court of Canada, 15 ADvocs' Q. 289, 306 (1993) (arguing tlat review of proportionality of ef-
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
been deployed with the stringency suggested by its earliest emergence
in Oakes.l00 Notably, the "minimal impairment" test has not been ap-
plied as a "least restrictive means" standard, but rather, as a more
flexible analysis of whether the degree of impairment of protected
rights is justifiable, considering the importance of the right, the de-
gree of intrusion, and the nature of the asserted government inter-
est.01 Yet, Canadian scholars are divided on whether to view this de-
velopment as the court's "fundamentally sound... moderation,
'' 0°
"prudential revisionism, "' or "stunning inconsistency"'O' - in short,
whether it is a good or a bad thing.05
Under Oakes' proportionality test, inquiry begins with the Court's
deciding what the purpose of challenged legislation is and whether
that purpose is legitimate and sufficiently important.' 06 This is not a
non-legal decision; indeed, it is similar to ones that U.S. constitutional
cases frequently address.! Some of the greatest arenas of controversy
fects and objectives "pushes at the margins of the judiciary's institutional role" and calls into
question legitimacy of constitutional review) with Martha Jackman, Protecting Rights and Promot-
ing Democracy: Judicial Review Under Section 1 of the Charter, 34 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 661, 674
(1996) (praising majority and dissenting opinions in RJR-MacDonald commercial speech case
for addressing democratic legitimacy of rights-infringing legislation); Monahan, supra note 58,
at 107, 114 (praising moderation of court and its deference to legislative decisions); Andrew
Lokan, The Rise and Fall of Doctrine Under Section I of the Charter, 24 OTrAWA L. REv. 163, 190-92
(1992) (praising the Canadian Court's abandonment of formal doctrine in favor of a more
categorical U.S.-style approach producing a more coherent approach that exposes the role of
normative judgments in judicial decision making) and Blache, supra note 59, at 450 (praising
court for move toward more open balancing).
10 See, e.g., STUART, supra note 59, at 18; Monahan, supra note 58, at 107-114.01 See, e.g., R. v. Keegstra [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 discussed infra text accompanying notes 118-
151.
102 Monahan, supra note 58, at 107, 118.
103 Blache, supra note 59, at 438.
104 STUART, supra note 59, at 18.
105 Some argue that the third criteria (proportionality of effects) itself never matters under
the Oakes test, because prior criteria (sufficiently important purpose, rational connection and
minimal impairments) preclude it from having independent force. See, e.g., HOGG,
CONsTITuIoNAL LAW OF CANADA, supra note 46, at 882-83; Lokan, supra note 99, at 172. The
Canadian cases suggest, however, that the overarching concept of proportionality between the
means used to achieve a legislative purpose, and both their positive effects in achieving that
purpose and their negative effects on protected rights, has become an important part of the
overall application of the Oakes test. This is well-illustrated in Dickson's opinion in Keegstra, dis-
cussed infra text accompanying notes 127-151.
106 See Oakes, at 138 (objective must be "pressing and substantial in a free and democratic so-
cieg").
Compare, for instance, General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 312 (1997) (holding
that a state has a legitimate interest in safety served by differential scheme for taxing natural gas
products) with Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (noting that the "desire to harm a politically
unpopular group" cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest). This is not to say that
the Court finds these judgments easy, or always agrees on the methodology for identifying the
purpose of a challenged law. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240-41 (1976) (in
holding that the Equal Protection Clause does not condemn neutrally-motivated action that has
a disproportionate impact on racial minorities, Court notes that such disproportionate impact
may be evidence of invidious purpose). Compare Justice Powell's opinion in Kassel v. Consoli-
dated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670-74 (1981), concluding that a purported safety regula-
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concern the definition and evaluation of legislative objectives.'' U.S.
constitutional law requires, in some areas, definition of a statute's
purpose, its legitimacy, and importance.'9 In this respect, both the
U.S. and Canadian constitutional systems already address similar
questions.
Moreover, both the U.S. and Canadian legal systems sometimes
require their constitutional courts to examine the nature of the con-
nection between the government purpose and the means chosen;
likewise, both systems are open to the charge that the definition of
purpose can be used to assure greater or lesser fit with the means
chosen." While the language of "proportionality" is not generally
used in the United States, the underlying questions - involving the
degree of fit between the claimed objective and the means chosen,
and a concern for whether the intrusion on rights or interests is ex-
cessive in relation to the purpose - are already an important part of
some fields of U.S. constitutional law, especially equal protection,'and free speech.112 The simplicity of the underlying idea of propor-
tion was unconstitutionally burdensome on interstate commerce, with Justice Brennan's con-
curring opinion, rejecting the purported safety justification as an after the fact rationalization.
See id. at 679-87.
108 Compare, for instanceJustice LaForest's view of the purpose of the law in RJR MacDonald
v. Canada [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, 272-73 (diminish tobacco consumption) ivith t e prevailingjus-
tices' view (discourage new smokers from starting to smoke by "reducing advertising-related
consumption"). See id. at 335-36 (McLachlin,J.). The narrower definition of the purpose led to
a finding that a ban on all advertising was disproportional, since a ban on the type of advertis-
ing targeted at new smokers would suffice, and advertising directed at existing smokers and en-
couraging them to change brands would not rationally and proportionally relate to that more
narrowly-defined goal. See id.
109 See Elena Kagan, Private Speedz Public Purpos The Role of Goterntal Motne m Fst
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHi. L REv 415, 447-53 (1996) (characterizing First Amendment
cases disfavoring content-based regulation as concerned ith improper government purpose).
See also United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (when speech and nonspcech ele-
ments combine in single course of conduct, "a sufficiently important governmental interest in
regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Atendment free-
doms"); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 352-53 (1977)
(discussing evidence of state's impermissibly protectionist motive in dormant Commerce Clause
constitutional challenge to apple-labeling law).
110 See generally, Note, Invidious Legislative Purpose, Rationali, and Equal Pm!eztaon, 82 Y UE L J.
123, 137-38 (1972) (arguing that "it is always possible for a court to define the evil or the good
at which legislation is aimed so as to make the statutory classification too broad or too narrow
for achieving the purpose thus defined").
I See, eg., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 202 (1976) (finding that the minor statistical differ-
ence between drunk driving by young men and young women was too "tenuous [a] fit" to justify
a different drinking age). See generaly STONE Er. AL., supra note 65, at 567-68 (discussing
means/ends nexus in equal protection analysis). On procedural due process, consider Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-50 (1976), which offered a balancing test to determine what pro-
cedures are required in administrative contexts, including the nature of tie private interest to
be affected, the risks of error and benefit of added procedures in reducing error, and the gov.
ernment interests in proceeding as it has been. One could conceive of Mlath-s as involving a
decision that the procedures required by the Constitution are no more than are proportional to
the interests at stake in light of the risks of error.
1 See, e-g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 US. 781, 796-802 (1989) (upholding require-
ment that performers use city-owned equipment in light of City's interest in noise control and
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tionality in U.S. constitutional law may be obscured by the several
doctrinal forms of multi-factored tests in which it is embodied.' s
These basic similarities between U.S. and Canadian approaches
suggest that differences in how analyses are conducted might usefully
be examined - for what lawyers and judges may be able to "borrow"
or "transplant"14 or for a better understanding of how the systems dif-
fer and of their possible need to differ. The Canadian proportionality
cases differ interestingly from some current U.S. constitutional ap-
proaches in several respects. First, the Canadian Supreme Court pro-
vides more contextualized attention to the circumstances of the chal-
lenged enactment. 5  Second, the Canadian Court's analyses
acknowledge a broader range of relevant, competing constitutional
values. Third, the Canadian justices explicitly consider comparative116
sources. Finally, Canadian cases seem to reflect a greater connec-tion between the articulated test and the decision-making process of
availability of other means of communication; regulation of time, place and manner of pro-
tected speech must be narrowly tailored but need not be least intrusive means; protected
speech may not be burdened more than necessary to further legitimate government interest);
Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 565 (1980)
(requiring that restrictions on commercial speech be no broader than necessary to accomplish
state's interest); O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (upholding ban on draft card burning because gov-
ernment interest in maintaining effective draft was sufficiently important to justify incidental
restrictions on First Amendment freedom of expressive conduct). See also 44 Liquormart Inc. v.
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 529-30 (1996) (O'ConnorJ. concurring) (arguing that ban on ad-
vertising beer prices failed the "final prong" of Central Hudson because the ban "is more exten-
sive than necessary to serve the State's interest" and the "fit between Rhode Island's method
and [its] goal is not reasonable"). For one Canadian writer's suggestion that the Oakes test is
similar to O'Brien, see Lokan, supra note 99, at 174.
11 See also BEATFY, supra note 78, at 107 (arguing that all important doctrines of U.S. consti-
tutional law concerning individual rights rely on standards of rationality and proportionality to
conduct means-end and equaling analyses). Unlike Beatty, I do not claim that proportionality
is a basic source of all constitutional doctrine, only that, even if the word itself is unfamiliar, the
concept as it is used in the Canadian cases is not. For a critique of Beatty's universalistic and
approving approach to judicial enforcement of constitutional rights, see Richard F. Devlin, Some
Recent Developments in Canadian Constitutional Theory With Particular Reference to Beatty and
Hutchinson, 22 QUEEN'S L. J. 81 (1996); see also ALLAN HUTCHINSON, WAITING FOR CORAF: A
CRITIQUE OF LAW AND RIGHTS 66-75 (1995) (criticizing Beatty's faith in his own account of the
Charter).
114 See Alan Watson, Legal Change: Sources of Law and Legal Culture, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 1121,
1124 (1983) (describing the extent of "legal transplants" and arguing that "[b]orrowing from
another system is the most common form of legal change").
1 The so-called "contextual approach" is anticipated in R. v. Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 139
(Dickson, CJ.) ("the nature of the proportionality test will vary depending on the circum-
stances") and was more fully developed by Justice Wilson in her concurrence EdmontonJournal
v. Alberta [AG.] [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326, 1353, 1355-56 and byJustice McLachlin in Rocket v. Royal
College of Dental Surgeons of Onterio [1990] 2 S.C.R. 232, 246-47. It was adopted by the Canadian
Court in R. v. Keegstra [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 737, 760-61 (concluding, inter alia, that the Section 1
analysis of a limit on Section 2(b) protected freedom of expression "cannot ignore the nature
of the expressive activity which the state seeks to restrict" and noting the "importance of context
in evaluating expressive activity under" Section 1).
16 See, e.g., R. v. Keegstra [1990] 3 S.C.R. 377, 738-44 (Dickson, CJ.) (discussing U.S. First
Amendment case law); id. at 811-23 (McLachlin, J., dissenting) (reviewing U.S. case law and
international experience).
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the judges, possibly with a corresponding increase in the accessibility
of the decision to outside observers."7 These differences are briefly
elaborated below.
1. Hate Speech Cases: Keegstra and RA .
As an example of these differences between Canadian propor-
tionality analysis and the more "categorical" approach of some U.S.
cases, consider R.A. V. v. St. Paut8 and R. v. Keegstra. "9 In R.A.V, the
U.S. Supreme Court struck down a St. Paul ordinance on the grounds
that the law - which punished hate speech amounting to "fighting
words" based on race, color, creed, religion, or gender - was an im-
permissible content-based and viewpoint-based regulation because it
excluded hateful "fighting words" not based on race, color, creed, re-
ligion, or gender.'20 In Keegstra, a closely divided Canadian Court up-
held the conviction of a high school teacher who used vividly anti-
Semitic language in his classes, under a criminal statute prohibiting
the "willful" promotion (other than in private conversation) of "ha-
tred against any identifiable group ... distinguished by colour, race,
religion or ethnic origin.
"
1
In Keegstra, all of thejustices agreed that, while the prohibition in-
fringed free expression guarantees of Charter Section 2(b),'- the
purpose of the statute was to prevent the promotion of group hatred
and that this w.vas a sufficiently legitimate and important interest, in
theory, to justify the infringement of rights under the first prong of
the Oakes' Section 1 test. Where the justices disagreed was in
whether the statute was proportional to this objective. The majority
found that the statute was rational, and that, in light of the peripheral
nature of the free expression interests implicated by hate speech, it
minimally impaired those interests. 24  In contrast, the dissent ques-
tioned the rationality of using criminal prosecutions to prevent hate
speech, arguing that such prosecutions may increase the appeal of
the purveyors of prejudice by "martyring" them.'2 Moreover, the dis-
117 For further discussion see infra text accompan)ing notes 144-145, 173-175.
505 U.S. 377 (1992).
1 [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697.
L SeetRA.V., 505 U.S. at 391.
121 Keegstra [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 715-16,795 (Dickson, C.J.).
122 See id at 725-34 (Dickson, C.J.); id. at 826-42 (McLachlin,J.. dissenting).
1 See id at 744-58 (Dickson, CJ.) (characterizing statute's objective as preventing harm
caused by hate propaganda and as pressing and substantial in a free and democratic society); 1d.
at 846-48 (McLachlin,J., dissenting) (agreeing that the law's objective is to prevent promotion
of hatred toward identifiable groups, thereby advancing social harmon) and individual dignity.
and that these objectives are "dearly... substantial" and, given world history of racial and relig-
ious conflict, "pressing").
1 See id. at 759-86 (Dickson, CJ.) (applying the three-part proportionality analysis of OeAs
to the challenged statute).
M See idL at 852-53 (McLachlin, J., dissenting) (asserting that the statute waus not rationally
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senters argued, the statute did not minimally impair free expression,
in light of the breadth of the statute and the track record of en-
forcement threats under it.'
26
Both the majority and the dissent in Keegstra, as in other Canadian
cases applying the Oakes proportionality test, demonstrate the influ-
ence of a context-specific approach. For example, the majority de-
scribes the work of an extrajudicial commission established in the
1960's to investigate hate crime in Canada in order to establish the
importance of the government's interest and the nature of the harms127
caused by hate speech. Both the majority and the dissent reviewed
factual material to conclude that the problem of hate speech in Can-
ada was substantial, although not of emergency dimensions. 2' In ex-
plaining its disagreement with the majority on proportionality, the
dissent did not hesitate to elaborate on the experience in pre-Nazi
Germany, which, it argued, suggests that the result of the prosecution
for hate crimes may be to increase, rather than decrease, such
crimes.' 29 The majority responded by explaining why, as an empirical
matter, it did not agree with the dissent's assessment of the evi-
dence. ' "° In R.A.V v. St. Paul, by contrast, both majority and dissent-
ing opinions rely almost entirely on past U.S. case precedents in re-
solving the difficult constitutional questions presented.
3'
Another interesting feature of Canadian cases is the degree to
which the justices explicitly identify competing constitutional values
and make comparative normative assessments about those values, and
in so doing consider the relevance of comparative materials. In R. v.
Keegstra, another area of disagreement concerned the relative weight
of the constitutional values that, all of the Justices agreed, were im-
portant under the Canadian constitution. For the majority, the con-
stitutional value of promoting Charter commitments to equality and
to a multicultural society by giving equal respect to different linguis-
tic, racial and religious groups provided strong reason to uphold the
hate statute.3 2 For the dissent, however, it was doubtful whether the
constitutional commitment to multiculturalism could ever outweigh
the constitutional value of free expression, given the role of free ex-
connected to the goal of preventing promotion of group hate because prosecutions provide
publicity to racists and generate sympathy for them).
126 See id. at 859-62 (McLachlin, J., dissenting) (noting inter alia that Salman Rushdie's book
SATANIC VERSES was stopped at the border for violating the standard).
127 See. v. Keegstra [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 745-46 (Dickson, C.J.).
128 See id. at 744-58 (Dickson,J.); id. at 846-48 (McLachlin,J., dissenting).
129 See id. at 854 (McLachlin, J., dissenting) (discussing hate propaganda regulation in pre-
Hitler Germany).
130 See id. at 768-71 (rejecting the assertion that barring hate speech would increase its occur-
rence).
1S3 See 505 U.S. at 382-390; id. at 397-408 (white, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 417-
25 (Stevens,J., concurring in the judgment).
132 See R. v. Keegstra [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 755-58 (Dickson, C.J.) (emphasizing Canada's con-
stitutional commitment in Charter § 15 to equality and in Charter § 27 to multi-culturalism).
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pression in protecting the democratic order.'"5 In discussing these is-
sues, both the majority and the dissent seemed to acknowledge the
importance of the values held by their fellowJustices in opposition to
their own expressed opinion.' By contrast, in RA.., the majority
opinion says little about the possible value of governmental opposi-
tion to hate speech and what it does say comes late in its opinion."'
And in Keegstra, both the majority and the dissent discuss interna-
tional and comparative materials, while the opinions in R.A.V. men-
tion neither.
5 7
Finally, the Canadian Section 1 opinions seem to lend themselves
to a candid discussion of constitutional conflict. In the Keegstra opin-
ions discussed above, one has the sense that the Canadian Justices
identified the baseline constitutional values and empirical judgments
that divide them, providing differing assessments of the weight to be
'" See i&L at 833-37, 849-50, 865 (McLachlin, J., dissenting) (rejecting claims that Charter §§
15 and 27 should limit protection afforded to free speech under § 2).
1 For example, Justice McLachlin's dissent includes a lengthy discussion of the harms
caused by hate speech. See Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. at 847-48 (stating, inter alia, thmt the 'continued
existence of hateful communication [undermines] a tolerant and welcoming society, [creating
harm] both to the individuals and groups who are the targets of prejudice, and to society as a
whole" including loss of talent of all its people).
ISs The Court's strongest statement is in the last paragraph of the opinion before the "re-
versed, and... remanded" sentence. Se RA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992)
("Let there be no mistake about our belief that burning a cross in someone's front yard is rep-
rehensible."); see also id at 392 (agreeing with the Minnesota state court that it is the responsi-
bility of communities to confront messages of hate); id. at 395 (agreeing that interests in ensur-
ing basic human rights are compelling, but suggesting adequate content neutral alternatives
casts doubt on whether the asserted justification is in fact the statute's purpose). The disagree-
ingjustices devoted more attention to the values that might support such an ordinance. Set id.
at 402 (White J., concurring in judgment) (characterizing cross burning as an expression of
violence, intimidation and racial hatred); i&L at 407 (arguing that the contested ordinance re-
flects city'sjudgment that harms based on race, color, creed, religion or gender are more press-
ing public concerns than harms caused by other fighting words, which, in light of the Nation's
long and painful experience with discrimination, is plainl)' reasonable).
See Keegstra [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 738-44 (Dickson, C.J.) (addressing "the relationship be-
tween Canadian and American approaches to the constitutional protection of free speech,"
summarizing U.S. cases, noting importance of being "explicit as to the reasons why or why not
American experience maybe useful in the § 1 anal)sis," and concluding, inter alia, that the First
Amendment's "strong aversion to content-based regulation of expression" is incompatible %vith
laws prohibiting hate speech but that "even in the United States" expression, e.g. child pornog-
raphy, can be regulated based on its content, and that the "special role given equality and mul-
ticulturalism in the Canadian Constitution necessitate a departure from the view.., that the
suppression of hate propaganda is incompatible with guarantees of free expression"); id. at 811-
23 (McLachlin,J. dissenting) (arguing that problem of hate literature and free expression "is
not peculiarly Canadian; it is universal;" futher arguing that U.S. experience is most relevant to
Canada's since both constitutions place high value on speech; revieming U.S. cases and empha-
sizing concerns to avoid chilling effects on legitimate speech, and noting that U.S. approach
requires "clear and present danger" before free speech can be overrided, in contrast to interna-
tional approach which finds the objective of suppressing hatred sufficient to override free ex-
pression).
For one very oblique reference see R.A.V v. City of St. Paul 505 U.S. at 382 (noting that
"our society, like other free but civilized societies has permitted" restrictions on speech in few.
limited areas).
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given to competing values and of the likely effects of enforcing the
particular law. By contrast, in R.A.V., one wonders whether the ma-
jority really is worried about the law's failure to make it a crime to say
"Racists are misbegotten "'u - that is, whether the failure of the hate
crimes statute to meet the "viewpoint neutrality" standard extended
to "fighting words" is sufficiently plausible to shed light on what the
justices were most in disagreement about.39 In .A. V, identifying the
legitimacy and importance of the statute's goals, and then analyzing
whether the law was a rational way to achieve the legitimate goals,
whether the law's adverse effects on important First Amendment in-
terests were sufficiently limited, and whether the law's effects were,
on the whole, proportional to the legitimate government interests,
might have yielded more convincing opinions in RA. V - although, as
Justice McLachlin's powerful Keegstra dissent suggests, not necessarily
a different result.
The Canadian course of decisions may also suggest, however, that
the effort to doctrinalize the idea of "proportionality"4 extends law
beyond the limits of what it can realistically achieve, and may obscure
the coherence that could otherwise emerge from an inquiry into le-
gitimacy of purpose and proportionality or reasonableness of
means. The test more recently applied is not the one implied in
Oakes - that the measure must always be the method of achieving the
objective that minimally impairs protected rights 142 - but rather, is a
138 Id. at 391-92 (characterizing the ordinance's practical operation as viewpoint discrimina-
tion because it does not prohibit sign that "all 'anti-Catholic bigots' are misbegotten," but does
prohibit a sign that all "papists" are misbegotten). Cf id. at 434-35 (Stevens, J., concurring in
judgement) (disagreeing with the Court's analysis of viewpoint discrimination because response
to sign that all anti-Catholic bigots are misbegotten is one that all advocates of tolerance are,
and both are treated the same by the ordinance).
139 See Morton Horwitz, Foreword, The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fun-
damentaism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 113-15 (1993) (criticizing RA.V. for combining "content
neutrality" and "obliviousness to social consequences," and as a "flight into abstraction and anti-
consequentialism," which ignored reality and resulted in shielding concrete terrorist acts of
cross-burning); see alsoAkhil Reed Amar, The Case of The Missing Amendments: RA.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 106 HARV. L. REV. 124, 161 (1992) (noting absence of the "power and passion" of storytel-
ling in R.A.V.). R.A.V. s suggestion that the presence of non-content-based alternatives - pre-
sumably, a broader prohibition on fighting words - somehow casts doubt on whether the city
really did have an interest in protecting the rights of members of groups historically discrimi-
nated against to live peacefully where they wish, see R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 395, leaves me mystified
at what nefarious purposes the majority suspects.
140 By "doctrinalize," I mean to distinguish sharply, as Oakes does, between the (i) rationality
of the law, (ii) the extent to which the law goes beyond the most limited intrusion on affected
rights, and (iii) the proportionality of the law's effects on protected rights.
Some Canadian scholars conclude that the final element of the Oakes test has played no
independent role, and that most of the water of the Oakes test is carried by the criteria of legiti-
mate and sufficiently important purpose, rational connection and minimal impairment. See,
e.g., HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA, supra note 46, at 882-83 (arguing that the final
step has "never had any influence on the outcome of any case" ... because it is "redundant"
with requirements of a sufficiently important purpose to warrant limiting rights, and of minimal
impairment).
See R. v. Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 139 (asserting that speech restrictions must be mini-
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more fluid, sliding-scale standard measuring the nature of the intru-
sion on the protected right against the importance of the objective."
In Keegstra, Justice Dickson, author of Oakes, explicitly disavows a
strong "least restrictive alternative reading" of this part of the test,
explaining:
In assessing the proportionality of a legislative enactment to
a valid government objective, [section] 1 should not oper-
ate in every instance so as to force the government to rely
upon only the mode of intervention least intrusive of a
Charter right or freedom. It may be that a number of
courses of action are available in the furtherance of a press-
ing and substantial objective, each imposing a varying de-
gree of restriction on a right or freedom. In such circum-
stances, the government may legitimately employ a more
restrictive measure, either alone or as part of a larger pro-
gram of action, if that measure is not redundant, furthering
the objectives in ways an alternative response could not, and
is in all other respects proportionate to a valid [section] I
aim.14
In summarizing his conclusion on "minimal impairment" and in
addressing the third "proportionality" criteria, Dickson explicitly
links the finding of "proportionality" to the importance under the
Charter of the interest in combating racial hatred, as well as the low
(albeit still protected by Section 2) value of the expression being
prohibited.' Likewise, the dissent in Keegstra, while reaching a dif-
ferent conclusion on minimal impairment, did not insist on a strict
malJ intrusive to survive constitutional muster); Lokan, supra note 99, at 172.
See Dassios & Prophet, supra note 99, at 302-03 (construing Irwin Toy Ltd. %,. Quebec, and
other post-Oakes cases to use a more deferential test than "least restrictive alternative" focusing
on the basis for the government's choice); Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec [1989) 1 S.C.R. 927. 999
("This Court will not, in the name of minimal impairment, take a restrictive approach to social
science evidence and require legislatures to choose the least ambitious means to protect vul-
nerable groups."); Chapman, supra note 89, at 889-90 (noting Canadian Court's retreat from
Oake' least restrictive means test in Edwards Books and Ail).
1 R v. Keegstra [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697,784-85.
1 See id. at 782, 785, 787 (stressing the value of combating racial hatred over the low value,
"only tenuously connected ith the values underl)ing the guarantee of freedom of speech." of
the hate speech being banned). This aspect of Justice Dickson's opinion in Kirtnra has been
criticized by some who argue that once expression is found to be protected by Section 2 of
Charter, its value should not be considered in analyzing the proportionality of the means used
to prohibit it. One benefit of the transparency of Dickson's opinion, houver, is that it directly
addresses the closeness of the relationship of hate speech to free expression values, arguing that
it does not lie at the core of what free expression protects. In treating this issue at length in
connection with proportionality, I take Judge Dickson to be suggesting that less is required to
justify intrusions on protected expression that is less close to core expressive values - an elabo-
ration of the principle of proportionality that corresponds to the normative constitutional val-
ues that seem to be motivating his analysis, and that, in its transparency, permits clear dis-
agreement.
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"least restrictive alternative" reading of the proportionality test.4 6
One Canadian judge has argued that the biting edge of the Oakes
test has, over time, turned on the Court's assessment of how signifi-
candy the challenged law impacts the rights protected by the Char-
ter, 4 with minor intrusions more likely to be upheld than more sub-
stantial ones. The test also seems to turn on assessment of the
relative value of the aspect of the right being infringed. One could,
148for example, read Keegstra and RJR MacDonald to suggest that ad-
vertising about lawful, although injurious, products is more impor-
tant to protect than hate speech. Thus, the Oakes proportionality
standard, with its frankly normative 9 and contextualized ap-
proaches 50 may have endured in part because of its flexibility in ac-
commodating both more, and less, deferential approaches to judicial
review.'
5 1
2. Transplanting Proportionality?
Returning to the question of what, if anything, the United States
could learn, or borrow, from Canada, on the one hand the "rough
146 See id. at 854-62 (McLachlin,J., dissenting). Interestingly, McLachlin suggests that use of a
criminal sanction (rather than a civil remedy) may itself be a constitutionally-disproportionate
response to intentionally hateful speech, given competing values of freedom of expression, and
alternative means of discouraging hate speech. Recent controversies in the United States con-
cerning prosecutorial discretion raise questions whether U.S. free speech law might benefit
from distinguishing between conduct that can be made the basis of a criminal prosecution or
investigation, on the one hand, and civil remedies on the other.
147 See Roger P. Kerans, The Future of Section One of the Charter, 23 U.B.C. L. REV. 567, 576
(1989).
148 RJR MacDonald v. Canada [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199.
149 See RJR MacDonald, at 268-78 (LaForest, J., dissenting) (stating that Section 1 inquiry is
frankly normative, requiring courts to take into account both the nature of the infringed right
and the specific values and principles on which the state seeks tojustify the infringement).
0 For example, in RJR MacDonald a substantial factor in the majority's decision to find that
the ban on tobacco advertising could not be sustained under Section 1 was a weakness in the
presentation of a form of legislative history. The government refused to reveal a confidential
report on which it purportedly relied in deciding that the total ban on advertising of a lawful
product was warranted. See id. at 345 (McLachlin, J.). See generally, Kerans, supra note 147, at
573 (noting the importance of legislative history, and the degree to which the legislative history
plausibly supports the government's claim of legitimate purpose).151 In RJR MacDonald, the Canadian Court held unconstitutional a federal ban on tobacco
advertising. See [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199. This case illustrates the degree to which the definition of
the purpose of a law can determine whether the law will be found to meet the "minimal im-
pairment" test. See id. at 335-49 (McLachlin,J.). For the majority, the purpose of the law was
only to prevent new smokers from starting; with so narrowly defined a purpose, the complete
ban (which included "brand switching" advertising purportedly designed to appeal only to ex-
isting smokers to change their brands) could not be seen as "minimally impairing" speech
rights. See supra note 108. The mutability of the precise definition of purpose to accord with
the doctrinal "minimal impairment" requirement suggests, in a sense, why the concept of pro-
portionality as more broadly understood may lead to more candid formulations. Cf Note, supra
note 110, at 154 (urging outright weighing of competing public policies without "diversionary
discussion" of rationality of means-end nexus).
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justice" of the idea of proportionality has much to commend iL'2
Troportionality" to "sufficiently important" purposes is no less defin-
able a legal principle than some of the more elaborated tests of U.S.
law on, for example, free speech 153 (although I do not suggest it is
equivalent to some of the more stringent categorical rules in the
United States, such as the rule against prior restraints of speech).
Moreover, as developed in the Canadian case law, the proportionality
test does appear to have certain advantages in its transparency of rea-
soning T5 and in its openness to the actual context of decision. These
qualities offer hope that, under a proportionality regime, the Cana-
dian court will distinguish between the "camel's nose" in the tent -
the dreaded slippery slope of the U.S. law school classroom leading to
judicial second-guessing of legislative policy judgments' - and a be-
nign cat's paw, providing a useful tool for making hard judgments in
distinguishing those restrictions that are "demonstrably justified in a
free and democratic society" and those that threaten the continuance
of that "free and democratic society."'m
152 Canadian scholar Peter Hogg has argued that, rather than having a generous interpreta-
tion of rights and a relaxed standard ofjustification under section 1, it would be better to read
the scope of the protected rights in the Charter quite narrowly and then to have a very rigorous
standard of review under section 1, entailing a very strong presumption against the validity of
infringements. See HOG,, CONSTrtUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA, supra note 46, at 859-60; Hogg,
Intereting the Charter of Rig^ts, supra note 87, passim. Given the expansive rights orientation of
the movement behind the Charter, however, this alternative approach might not fairly capture
the values of both rights-development and of inclusion and pluralism, so evident in the Charter
and in Canada's evolving self-conception.
15 See, e-g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) (striking dowm law prohibiting dis-
plays of banners on public sideualks around the Supreme Court building. because government
may enforce reasonable time, place and manner restrictions in public forums only if the restric-
tions are content neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and
leave open ample alternative channels of communication; particular types of expression may be
prohibited only if the prohibition is narrowly drawm to accomplish a compelling governmental
interest); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988) (upholding ordinance that prohibited resi-
dential picketing on a public street that targeted a particular residence because 'privacy of the
home is certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society" and thus traranted the
complete prohibition of targeted residential picketing).
SeeJeremy Kirk, Constitutional Guarantees, Charaeaisation and Proptionality, 21 MELD. U. L.
REv. 1, 55-56, 64 (1997) (commenting that "proportionality" tests require more candor in iden-
tifying competing values and interests).
See Kerans, supra note 147, at 577. In emphasizing the importance of a laws impact ir
evaluating its constitutionality, Judge Roger Kerans distinguishes the Canadian approach from
what he describes as the American tendency to "worry a lot about the camel's noise." ld. Can-
ada, being more practical, can distinguish "between innocuous publication bans today and ma-
jor censorship tomorrow." Id.
'm See Can. Charter (1982), § 1. Interestingly, in RJR MacDonald t Canada [1995] 3 S.C.R.
199 and 44 Liquonnart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996), the Canadian and US. Supreme
Courts reached fairly similar results in striking dowa the constitutionality of complete bans on
advertising for legal products. In Canada, the ban applied to tobacco advertising- in Rhode Is-
land, the ban applied to advertising of liquor prices. In both cases, the respective governments
sought to justify their laws on grounds the courts either accepted without comment or found
"legitimate" - in Canada, to reduce tobacco-associated health risks by reducing consumption
motivated by advertising, see RJR MacDonald [1995] 3 S.C.R. at 336 (McLachlin. J.); in the
United States, to increase beer prices to promote temperance, see 44 Liquonr.art, 517 U.S. at 504-
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On the other hand, there are a number of reasons for caution in
embracing use by U.S. courts of the Canadian proportionality test.
First, the contextual, accessible form of reasoning in the Canadian
opinions enhances the risk that the decisions will be viewed as less the
product of "law" than of particularized judgments. It is plausible that
the framers of the Charter intended the courts to engage in norma-
tive balancing of constitutional values.17 Thus, in Canada perhaps a
greater concern than countermajoritarianism (that is, the legitimacy
of the Court's displacement of legislative decisions) is with the pre-
dictability of contextualized judgments and the substantive weighting
of constitutional values. The United States, by contrast, has not so
recently been through a process of self-conscious constitution forma-
tion, and participants in its legal system may accordingly be more un-
easy about justfying the exercise of judicial judgment in the face of
legislative 
will.' 
ts
Moreover, the problem of distinguishing false and true necessities
08. Yet, in both cases, the courts found that the purported purpose did notjustify the means.
In addition, the question was raised whether withholding accurate information from consumers
is ever valid, either as a means or an end. The proportionality test in RJR MacDonald may have
been used to simultaneously approach and evade the issue whether it is ever legitimate to with-
hold from consumers information about lawful products on paternalistic grounds. See [1995J 3
S.C.R. at 343-45 (McLachlin, J.) (observing that the law deprives consumers of a legal product
of "important means of learning about product availability to suit their preference, [and that] it
will be more difficult to justify a complete ban on a form of expression than a partial ban," and
concluding that the ban was more intrusive on free expression than necessary to accomplish its
goals). The majorities of both courts applied stringent evidentiary standards in addressing the
effect of the means on the government purpose, relied on an absence of evidence directly show-
ing that the ban would materially decrease consumption, and discounted evidence that the
product manufacturers or retailers thought there was a connection between advertising and
sales. See RJR MacDonald [1995] 3 S.C.R. at 341-42 (McLachlin, J.); 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at
501, 505-06. Neither Court was willing wholeheartedly to adopt the idea expressed by Justice
Thomas in Liquormart that the suppression of information about a lawful product is per se inva-
lid. See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 518-528 (Thomas,J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); id. at 504-14 (Stevens,J.); RJR MacDonald [1995] 3 S.C.R. at 343-44. Yet, both results
tend to support the view of a Canadian commentator that application of free speech norms
here suggest a "consumer/consumption" oriented view of a "free and democratic society," in
which a defining freedom is consumption choices (rather than or in addition to political ones).
See David Schneiderman, A Comment on RJR-MacDonald v. Canada, 30 U.B.C. L. REV. 165, 175-
80 (1996).
. See e.g., PATRICK MONAHAN, THE CHARTER, FEDERALISM AND THE SUPREME COURT OF
CANADA 30, 53-60, 78-79 (1987) (arguing that under the Charter courts are required to balance
interests and exercise judicial "originality" in interpretation).
Although there are Canadian scholars who condemn the flexibility of the evolving Oakes
test of proportionality, there are others who are more enthusiastic, for reasons that arguably
correspond to Canadian legal culture more than that of the United States. In contrast to Pro-
fessor Tribe's description of the universalistic, individual rights-based U.S. legal culture, see
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 73-84 (1992), compare the evident
pride of some Canadian constitutionalists in what they describe as Canada's claim to "the mid-
dle ground" in "the world of ideas." See DALE GIBSON, THE LAW OF THE CHARTER: GENERAL
PRINCIPLES iv-v (1996) (describing Canadian Supreme Court decisions as evincing approach to
legal decision-making called "the Principled Middle"); see also MONAHAN, supra note 157, at 12
(arguing that "Canadian politics has always placed particular emphasis on the value of commit-
nity, in contrast to the overriding individualism of the American experiment").
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is an enduring and difficult one: Is U.S. legal culture likely to do with
a proportionality test what Canadian legal culture does? Is the use of
more formal rules and tests more important in the United States,
given the size of the country, heterogeneity of population, and the
diversity of lower court systems that are controlled by Supreme Court
decisions?"" Is U.S. legal culture likely to view a less formal, more
open-ended approach examining the "proportionality" of legislative
means to legitimate legislative goals as an illegitimate expression of
judicial preferences as an opportunity for invidious biases to affect
decision-making?'1 Or will the courts be able to explain with enough
consistency what makes a scheme proportionate, and why the meas-
ure of proportionality will vary depending on the importance of the
right infringed by the law, the degree of intrusion on the protected
right, and the government interests being served? Do other features
of Canadian constitutional law mitigate the difficulties of its Court
having authority under Section 1 to decide whether or not particular
statutes that infringe on rights are nonetheless valid under the Oakes
test?'
6'
A "comparativist" challenge to consideration of "proportionality"
analyses might invoke earlier periods in U.S. constitutional history,
when, for example, First Amendment cases employed "balancing"
analyses, to demonstrate the jurisprudential evils of an approach like
"proportionality" analysis that relies in part on balancing.""' In Dennis
v. United States'63 convictions for violations of the conspiracy provi-
sions of the Smith Act were upheld based on evidence that the de-
fendants "organize[d] people to teach and themselves [taught] Marx-
ist-Leninist doctrine contained chiefly in four books ... ."' Both the
plurality opinion and the Frankfurter concurrence relied on balanc-
ing tests that sought to measure the gravity of the evil the government
19 On the constraining effects of formal rules, see Frederick Schauer. Fornnahsrn. 97 YU.E UJ.
509 (1988).
16 See, eg., TRIBE, supra note 158, at 74-75.
161 Canada's Charter, for example, also includes the "nomthstanding clause- of Section 33.
which authorizes both federal and provincial parliaments to enact laws, for a fite-ear period.
.notwithstanding" many provisions of the Charter. One could argue that when the legislature
chooses not to invoke Section 33, it has by implication consented to tie Canadian courts' re-
view under the criteria of Section 1. Cf. MONAHN, supra note 157. at 81, 115-ti0 (arguing thal
inclusion of the override provision was a recognition by framers of Charter that courts might
interpret Charter in unforeseeable ways); Conklin, supra note 92. at 84 (arguing that in te ab-
sence of an override, courts must exercise stringent review of infringements of rights). One
might also argue that, in the United States, the absence of an analogous legislati e po%%er to
either short circuit or overcome the results ofjudicial review makes it more important for judt-
cial review to be conducted under more formalistic and restrained approaches.
162 For a classic argument against balancing as a form of constitutional reasonmg. see gener-
ally, T. Alexander Aleinikoff, ConsitutionalLaw in theAge of Balancing, 96Y.LE I-J. 943 (1987).
163 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
64 Id. at 582 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (identif~ing the four books as JoSUEII SrUI\.
FOUNDATIONS OF LENtNISM (1824); KARL NMARX & FRIEDRICH FNGELs, MvIFESWu OF ni.
COMMNIST PARTY (1848); V.I. LENIN, THE STATE AND REVOLULTON (1917); and Htsto ft OF
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SovIEr U,,IoN (1939)).
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sought to contain by its passage of the Smith Act against the accom-
panying intrusion on free speech'I 5 Many First Amendment scholars
now view the Court's decision in Dennis, and perhaps especially the
Frankfurter concurrence, as wrongly reasoned and decided.' 6  The
approach of the Court in Dennis was essentially abandoned in Bran-
denburg v. Ohio,167 currently the leading case on speech advocating un-
lawful conduct. 6
But it is not at all clear that it was the use of a balancing test used
in Dennis that led to what is now seen as an erroneous decision, un-
derprotective of free speech. Rather, the plurality - applying the
more definitional "clear and present danger" test, - and Frankfurter
- applying a more overt balancing analysis - gave greater weight to
the danger of violent overthrow of the government and less weight to
the value of free expression of communist teachings than would be
the case under contemporary approaches. Frankfurter's concurrence
addressed head on those values and interests that both the majority,
and the dissent, agreed were relevant. 9 Frankfurter's key analytical
move in conducting his balancing was to announce a principle of
strong deference to the legislature, 7 ° a principle at odds with coun-
termajoritarian purposes of protecting freedom of speech and far
more problematic than his candid expression of both free speech
values and his interest in what was then viewed as government sur-
vival. 17' Dennis might be taken to indicate that the stance of deference
165 See id. at 503 (plurality opinion) ("societal value of speech must, on occasion, be subordi-
nated to other values and considerations"); id. at 509 ("Overthrow of the Government by force
and violence is certainly a substantial enough interest for the Government to limit speech"); id.
at 510 (adopting Learned Hand's formulation of a balancing test measuring discounted value
and weight of the harm against the invasion on free speech); id. at 519-25 (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring) (arguing that government's inherent right to maintain its existence justifies some re-
strictions on speech, and that courts should defer to legislative "balance" of the relevant fac-
tors).
1 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1372 (1984) (calling
Frankfurter's Dennis concurrence "one of the great scandals of balancing"); Laurent B. Frantz,
The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962) (criticizing Dennis and arguing
against "balancing" rules in free speech cases). For a contrary view, see, e.g., Wallace Mendelson,
On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CAL. L. REV. 821 (1962).
167 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
168 Brandenburg holds that "mere advocacy" of unlawful conduct is protected by the First
Amendment and that only if the advocacy becomes "incitement" of "imminent unlawful con-
duct" can the speech be punished. Id. at 449.
169 Compare Frankfurter's concurrence in Dennis, 341 U.S. at 519-25 (recognizing individuals'
First Amendment rights to think, read, and teach what they please, as well as the right of the
government to preserve itself) with Douglas's Dennis dissent, id. at 588-89 (stating that "[tjhe
nature of Communism as a force on the world scene would, of course, be relevant to the issue
of clear and present danger of petitioners' advocacy within the United States," but there was no
record evidence of communist power within the United States and the Court could take judicial
notice that as a political party it was politically impotent).
170 See id at 525-26 (Frankfurter,J., concurring).
1 On the purposes of protecting freedom of speech, even theories that emphasize political
speech and the needs of representative democracies (as compared to broader theories more
protective of speech that emphasize human autonomy or identity expression, artistic expression
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that ajudge or court takes towards a problem matters at least as much
as whether the doctrinal test is formulated as one of balancing or one
of definition.'
One might also challenge the claim that analysis under a propor-
tionality or other "balancing" test will be more transparent than
analysis relying on more formal categories as rules for decision. Both
logical and empirical reasons exist, however, to think this might be
so. Logically, as Schauer and Tushnet demonstrate, the characteristic
of a formal rule, and of formalism in applying a rule, is to ignore fea-
tures of the case, or context, that might argue for a different result."'
The salient characteristic of formalist analysis is the constraining
force of the rule against the felt necessities of particular cases. And if
the rule of decision does not permit some factors to be of relevance,
it would not be illogical to ignore or discount those factors; doing so
might avoid or minimize professional discomfort. Apart from logic,
I rely on widely held (but not quantitatively verified) impressions that
"standards" as opposed to "rules," or multi-factored balancing tests as
opposed to categorical rules, are likely to provide a larger range of
arguably relevant constitutional factors than application of a more
formal rule (e.g. "no content based" regulation or "no prior re-
straint"of speech) .'
Note, however, that either formalist or "balancing" reasoning
might produce a formal ru/&'7" Compare, for instance, the opinion of
the U.S. Supreme Court in RA.V, which relies on reasoning that is
formalist in character to insist on a formal rule that invalidates the
or the search for truth) recognize the need to protect expression by those in the minorit as
well as in the majority. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEEcH AND Irs RELTiO', To SEL-
GOVERNMENT 15-16, 24-27, 39 (1948) (arguing that the First Amendment requires that "no sug-
gestion of policy shall be denied a hearing because it is on one side of the issue rather than the
other"). Deference to legislative majorities is thus in some respects p,-micularly inappropriate
in reviewing statutes aimed at minority political viewpoints. Se Martin Ff. Redish, AIv,-ae of
Unlawfud Conduct and the irst Amendment: In Defense of Cear and Present Dang 70 C.UIF. L REV.
1159, 1198 (1982).
1'2 SeeVicki C.Jackson, Printz and Testa:" The Infrastrudure of Federal Supreran. 32 l\D. L RE'.
111, 13840 (1998) [hereinafterJackson, Pyintz and Testa].
11 See Schauer, supra note 159, at 510; Mark Tushne, The Hardest Question in Constitutional
Law, 81 MiNN. L. REV. 1, 13-18 (1996).
174 On what some regard as the inevitability of "role discomfort" in being a "good judge," see
Guido Calabresi, Foreword: Anti-Discrimination and Constitutional Acrountabdht: lS71t tMe Bath-
Brennan Debate Ignores, 105 HARV. L REV. 80, 132 n.169 (1991) ("A judge w ho does not decide
some cases, from time to time, differently from the way he would uish. because die philosophy
he has adopted requires it, is not ajudge," although ajudge who never stra-s from ins judicial
philosophy "no matter how important the issue involved, is a fool").
175 See, eg., Kathleen Sullivan, The Justice of Ries and Standards, 106 I-LRv. L REv. 22 (19102);
see also Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech in the United States and Canada, 55 LW & CON'stLP. PROft. 5
(1992) (discussing and contrasting "balancing" and "conceptual" approaches to freedom of
speech).
See Richard H. Fallon,Jr., Foreword. Impleenting the Constitution, Il I -LRR'. L REV'. 54. 80-
81 (1997) (distinguishing betveen balancing of multiple factors in formulating a rule ad bal-
ancing as part of the required test formulated by the Court).
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hate speech ordinance at issue, 177 with Justice McLachlin's concern, in
her R. v. Keegstra dissent, over the potential misuse of hate speech
statutes against oppressed groups themselves, and her further con-
cern that prosecutions under hate speech statutes may be counter-
productive towards equality and ant-discrimination goals because
they tend to make martyrs of the defendants.' 7 8 Arguments in favor of
a categorical rule, then, can be formally analytical, as in RA. V. v. St.
Paul, or may reflect contextual judgments about a range of factors, as
in the McLachlin dissent in R. v. Keegstra. Even under a "proportion-
ality" analysis, moreover, rules could emerge that would prohibit con-
tent-based restrictions on an analysis similar to MacLachlin's. Trans-
parency values in defining the legal rule can thus be served, at least in
part, by the reasoning that produces a formal rule, although as lower
courts apply the rule some of this value may be lost.
Finally, advocates of more categorical, formal rules argue that
such rules will yield greater predictability in results than more open-
ended judgments under multi-factored standards. Much of the an-
swer to the question whether "proportionality" analyses will be too
unpredictable will lie in the "doing." Balancing standards bear some
risk of too much fluidity, permitting constitutional values to yield too
readily to the perceived expediences and conveniences of the given
time; Alex Aleinikoff has rightly pointed to the risk of reducing
"rights" to simply an item of cost and benefit that balancing meta-
phors may entail. 79 Yet proportionality analysis, in its emphasis on
judgment, may be less likely to have this effect than "balancing" tests
articulated in the language of a scientific scale. Categorical rules,
moreover, may obscure more than prevent the exercise of judgment
about matters of context and degree.'8° Free speech values under
proportionality analysis should be given great weight in a free and
7 The formalism of its reasoning is manifest, for example, in the Court's analytical concern
with a hypothetical example of anti-bigotry "hate" speech being outside the reach of the statute,
in order to demonstrate that the statute is not content or viewpoint neutral, as if the logic of the
"no content based" rule would be convincingly self-evident in such a decontextualized (some
might say, counterfactual) setting.
See [1990] 3 S.C.R 697, 701.
1-9 Aleinikoff, supra note 162, at 987.
190 For example, the rule against prior restraints on speech can fairly be understood as a
categorical rule. However, defining what counts as speech and as a prior restraint, and whether
there are exceptions to the rule (as in where there is a clear and present danger that the speech
sought to be restrained will lead to imminent violence), all involve questions ofjudgment and
context. Compare, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980) (per curiam) (up-
holding enforcement of former CIA employee's agreement not to publish information without
prepublication clearance and rejecting argument that the agreement was an unenforceable
prior restraint on speech) with New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (re-
versing an injunction against newspaper publication of a secret Defense Department study of
Vietnam war, leaked by a former Pentagon official, because the government had not met its
heavy burden of overcoming the presumptive rule against prior restraints); id. at 731 n.1
(White, J., concurring) (noting that National Labor Relations Board and Federal Trade Com-
mission cease-and-desist orders often restrain what employers or businesses can say, and that
copyright laws also authorize injunctive relief).
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democratic society, and proportionality analysis could yield presump-
tive protection for speech falling into categories that a court views as
highly protected.'8' Finally, how important predictability is as a value
may vary with the constitutional context, and the hardest cases at any
point in time may be least likely to be constrained by preexisting
"formal" rules and the most difficult to predict under "balancing"
analyses.
Whether in the lower courts some constitutional values may be
better protected through categorical rules rather than multi-factored
analyses, seems open to debate. (As noted earlier, the size and diver-
sity of lower courts that will be called on to enforce and apply the rule
may be relevant to this inquiry.') What Keegstra illustrates is that
constitutional reasoning in difficult cases can be illuminatingly car-
ried out under the "proportionality" test and that this approach has
some advantages over alternative styles of reasoning.
Keegstra raises, but cannot answer the question whether U.S. con-
stitutional reasoning and law would be improved by use of such alter-
native approaches, or, more generally, by considering how other con-
stitutional systems have responded to similar problems. As discussed
below, awareness of the uses of "proportionality" analyses in the con-
stitutional law of other nations may help in understanding the impli-
cations and possibilities of the U.S. Supreme Court's recent embrace
of the idea of proportionality in City ofBoerne v. Flores.'"
B. City of Boerne v. Flores: Proportionality and Federalism
In Flores, the Court held unconstitutional the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act [RFRA]. RFRA was enacted in direct response to the
Court's 1990 decision in Smith v. Employment Division," which
changed prior law to hold that neutral generally-applicable laws may
constitutionally be applied even to those who claim that the law im-
poses a burden on a religious practice. Under Smith, generally-
applicable laws, such as those prohibiting the use of peyote, pre-
scribing the diet for state prisoners, ' 6 or requiring autopsies in casesof sudden death,' are immune from attack on the grounds that for
181 SeeLokan, supra note 99, at 163 (predicting development of categorical rules through ap-
plications of Section 1 proportionality analysis). Some Canadian scholars have argued that the
Oakes proportionality test ought to be applied with different levels of scrutiny for different cat-
gories of conduct in the free expression area; for example, political speech would be more
highly protected than commercial speech. See Cameron, supra note 59, at 69-72.
See LawTence Lessig, Translating Federaism- United States v. Loprz 1995 Sep. Cr. REV 125,
172-73 (1995).
e 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
184 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
165 See i
18 For pre-Smith cases involving such claims, see, for example. McElyea v. Babbitt. 833 F.2d
196 (9th Cir. 1987); Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1975).
18 See, eg., Yang v. Sturner, 750 F. Supp. 558, 559 (D.R.I. 1990) (upholding constitutionality,
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some persons (typically members of minority religious groups) the
practice proscribed by law is required by their religion or that the
practice required by law is prohibited by their religion.
Under RFRA, by contrast, neutral, generally-applicable laws could
be challenged as burdening religious practice. Under RFRA, a state,
local, or federal government may not impose a substantial burden on
a religious practice unless the government can establish that the bur-
den it is imposing is the least restrictive means of serving a compel-
ling government interest.
188
F/ores held that this statute exceeded Congress's power under Sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 9 The Section 5 power, the
Court concluded, was limited to remedying or preventing violations of
Section 1 and did not permit Congress to change or to alter the sub-
stanive meaning of the rights secured by Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amdendment. While recognizing that the distinction between re-
medial and substantive laws was a fine one, the Court nonetheless
found that RFRA was an impermissible attempt to alter the meaning
of the Free Exercise Clause as it had been interpreted by the Court in
Smith.'9' In light of the Smith decision concerning what constitutes a
free exercise violation, the F/ores Court held RFRA to be an impermis-
sible exercise of the Section 5 power because RFRA could not be re-
under Smith, of requiring autopsy notwithstanding Hmong religious beliefs). According to Flo-
res, much of the legislative discussion preceding RFRA focused on concern over autopsies per-
formed "on Jewish individuals and Hmong immigrants in violation of their religious beliefs."
521 U.S. at 531 (citingReligious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991, Hearing on H.R. 2797 before
the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on thejudiciary,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1993) [hereinafter "House Hearings"] (statement of Nadine
Strossen)); id. at 107-10 (statement of William Yang); id. at 118 (statement of Rep. Stephen J.
Solarz); id. at 336 (statement of Douglas Laycock); Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Hearing
on S. 2969 before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary , 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6, 14-26
(1993) [hereinafter "Senate Hearings"] (statement of William Yang); id. at 27-28 (statement of
Hmong Lao Unity Ass'n., Inc.); id. at 50 (statement of BaptistJoint Committee).
18 See 42 U.S.C.. § 2000bb-1 (1993). FHores's holding that RFRA exceeds Congress's power
under the Fourteenth Amendment does not necessarily invalidate RFRA as applied to the fed-
eral government.
1 See 521 U.S. at 529-36. Interestingly, the Court held that Congress's Section 5 enforce-
ment powers did extend to enforcing the First Amendment protection of the free exercise of
religon as extended to the states by Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 519.
See id. at 519-24. In so ruling, the Court relied on the drafting history of the Fourteenth
Amendment and reached a conclusion that differs from those of some scholars. See, e.g., John
P. Frank and Robert F. Munro, The Original Understanding of Equal Protection of the Laws, 1972
WASH. U. L. Q. 421, 430 (arguing that framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended that
Congress could extend the Bill of Rights under Section 5, not that Section 1 would have self-
executing effect, enforced by the courts, of doing so); RobertJ. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Con-
stitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y. U. L. REV. 863, 867, 884-86, 912-
14 (1986) (arguing that the drafters of Fourteenth Amendment were more concerned with en-
suring a constitutional basis for Congress's authority to protect fundamental rights of national
citizenship than with protecting individual rights, and that the concern leading to the change
in the wording of the Amendment relied on by the Hores Court was that, without some self-
executing provisions, Congress might infringe or fall to protect the rights of national citizen-
sh'R,)'See Hores, 521 U.S. at 532-35.
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garded as proportional to its assertedly remedial or preventive objec-
tive.'9
Viewing the statute as a claimed remedial or preventative meas-
ure, the Court held that RFRA could not be regarded as "as a rea-
sonable means of protecting the free exercise of religion as defined
by Smith;" instead, the statute lacked "congruence between the means
used and the ends to be achieved. ""g3 Flores thus invoked the norm of
proportionality as an important test of whether a measure enacted
pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment would be re-
garded as a valid measure to remedy or to prevent a violation of Sec-
tion 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, or as an invalid attempt by
Congress to define the substantive meaning of Section 1.
In explaining its conclusion of nonproportionality, the Court first
noted that the legislative record was virtually bereft of contempora-
neous examples of generally-applicable laws passed as a result of re-
ligious bigotry - the type of laws that would violate the free exercise
clause as defined in Smith. Instead, the focus of the legislative hear-
ings was on "laws of general applicability which place incidental bur-
dens on religion," that, under Smith, were constitutionally valid.'"'
Apart from the legislative record, however, and more important for
the Court, was the fact that "RFRA is so out of proportion to a sup-
posed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as
responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior. " "
In reaching this conclusion the Court relied on (1) the broad sweep
of RFRA (2) RFRA's lack of temporal or geographic limits; and (3)
the rigor of the test it imposed on any government practice alleged to
burden religion and the ensuing burdens this placed on the defend-
ing governments,' a "considerable congressional intrusion into the
States' traditional prerogatives and general authority to regulate for
the health and welfare of their citizens... imposing a heavy litigation
burden... [and] curtailing their traditional general regulatory
"197power ....
However novel this proportionality test may sound to U.S. consti-
tutional ears, as described above the idea of proportionality as a
1'9 See id. at 532.
193 d at 529-30.
194 Id. (citing the legislative record found in House Hearings, supra note 187, at 331-34
(statement of Douglas Laycock); Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1990, Hearing on H.R.
5377 before the Subcommittee on Ciil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on
the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 2d Sess. 49 (statement ofJohn H. Buchanan. Jr.) Senate Hearings,
supra note 187, at 30-31 (statement of Dallin H. Oaks); id. at 6886 (statement of Douglas La)-
cock). The Court noted "[t]he absence of more recent episodes [of intentional religious dis-
crimination] stems from the fact that, as one witness testified, 'deliberate persecution is not the
usual problem in this country.'" F/ora, 521 U.S. at 530 (citing House Hearings at 334 (statement
of Douglas Laycock)).
195 Reres 521 U.S. at 532.
196 See id. at 532-36.
197 Id. at 534.
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measure of the constitutionality of laws is highly developed in Cana-
dian constitutional law. It is also a marked feature of German consti-
tutional law.'9 Yet in both Canada and Germany, courts appear to in-
voke the concept of proportionality primarily in decisions relating to
individual rights and not in cases involving the distribution of federal
powers.'9 Awareness of this feature of Canadian case law prompts the
question whether a proportionality test serves (or should serve) the
same function in addressing federalism issue, like that in F/ores, as it
does in a free speech case like Keegstra.
If one conceives of the division of powers between the federal and
state governments as similar to the arena of individual freedom, that
is, as according rights to each level of government to regulate within
their sphere, then the concept of proportionality can be regarded as
doing much the same work. A proportionality analysis of a govern-
ment regulation claimed to violate an individual right asks whether
the regulation itself is proportional to the government's asserted le-
gitimate goal, and whether the harm caused to individual rights is
proportional to the possible benefits of the regulation. Such a test
can be applied in more or less deferential ways, and with greater or
lesser degrees of ex ante categorization. Likewise, if one conceives of
states as having "rights" to regulate some substantive areas (e.g., fam-
ily law, inheritance laws, "local" commerce), then a proportionality
198 SeeAlexander Somek, The Deadweight of Formulae: What Might Have Been the Second Gennani-
zation of American Equal Protection review, 1 PA. J. CONsT. L. 284, 317-320 (1998) (discussing the
German Federal Constitutional Court's clear mandate under its "New Formula" that a strict test
of proportionality should be applied in specified cases); see also KOMMERS, supra note 53, at 46
(describing proportionality as "crucial to any understanding of German constitutional law,"
"play[ing] a role similar to the American doctrine of due process of law," an "approach ... not
so different from the methodology often employed by the United States Supreme Court in fun-
damental rights cases," involving three steps: "determining the legitimacy of a state purpose;"
deciding under a flexible standard whether the means used "have the least restrictive effect...
on a constitutional value," and deciding whether "the means used [are] proportionate to the
end"); CURRIE, supra note 53, at 307-10 (explaining that the proportionality principle dates
back to Magna Carta and was developed by German Enlightenment thinkers, including Svarez,
who "plainly stated two distinct proportionality requirements. First, the state was justified in
restricting the liberty of the individual 'only to the extent necessary for the liberty and security
of others'; Second, the evil to be prevented must be substantially greater than the attendant
harm to individual liberty .... [This] insiste[nce] on proportionality both between ends and
means and between costs and benefits [is] reflected in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional
Court.").
199 See HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA, supra note 46, at 805-06 (distinguishing
"characterization" of a law's "pith and substance" on federalism-based challenge, from charac-
terization of a law challenged under the Charter's individual rights provisions, with more focus
on the law's effects in Charter review); CURRIE, supra note 53, at 307-10 (linking proportionality
in German law to individual rights issues). But see BEATIY, supra note 78, at 36-39 (arguing that
Canadian federalism cases have developed concept of proportionality, although without using
that term itself, as a basic tool for measuring scope of federal government and provincial pow-
ers). In Australia and the European Union, proportionality has been invoked in cases dealing,
respectively, with the characterization of the powers of the federal and state governments, and
with whether regulatory action of the European Union organs is authorized by the relevant
treaties.
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analysis of federal regulation could ask whether the regulation is
proportional to the federal government's asserted legitimate objec-
tive, and whether the harm caused to the states' right to regulate is
proportional to the benefits of federal regulation. "
Critical to such an application of proportionality analysis to feder-
alism issues is the premise that there exists a definable allocation of
"rights" to regulate in certain areas assigned to the sub-national
level(s) of government. But if states do not have "rights," analogous
to individual rights, to regulate in particular areas,-' then the consti-
tutional judgment being sought should differ.2 If one conceives of
the arena of state government power to regulate private activities as
an area that is defined in large part by the exercise of federal power,
flexible, and changing over time, then proportionality anal)sis should
have a smaller role to play in federalism-based challenges to the con-
stitutionality of national action. If states have no "right" to retain ex-
clusive legislative authority over particular areas, what is the baseline
against which to measure the proportionality of harm to something
analogous to a constitutional rightsss One could still inquire whether
the measure is proportional to the asserted legitimate purpose of the
federal governmental activity and to the harms caused to state inter-
ests.2°4 But this inquiry could be either very diffuse, very intrusive, or
both. Without a baseline measure of a "right" to regulate, or a rule
constraining the level of detail of federal enactments (which exists in
some constitutional systems but not in the United States), applica-
.0 For an argument that proportionality (and other) principles in Canada have been used to
increase the concurrent powers of both federal and proincial governments, see B,M. supra
note 78, at 25-29, and also see HOGG, CONSIMMTIOtoAL LAw OF C.MDA, supra note 46, at 377-
85 (describing the Court's techniques of characterisation and recognition of multiple purposes
to uphold areas that are, in effect, of concurrent federal-provincal powers).
- For discussion, see Jackson, Federa/ism, supra note 36, at 2231-33. 2252-53 (arguing that
states do not have constitutionally protected enclaves of power to regulate private activity free
from federal intervention but that states' maintenance of their own executive, legislative, and
judicial branches is constitutionally protected).
Proportionality analysis could still, in theory, address the underl)ing policy question by
comparing the costs and benefits of centralization (through national legislation) to those of
decentralization. Yet, absent some legal directive or standard to guide this determination. it is
difficult to see why on a pure cost benefit analysis one would prefer a court's judgment to that
of the legislature.
M" In Australia, as in the United States, there are few, if any, explicit powers reserved to the
States. At least one Australian jurist has criticized the use of proportionality to protect stateju-
risdiction as such, while offering guarded support for its use to test the validity of the charac-
terization" of federal laws as falling within federal powers (at least when those powers are lim-
ited by a requirement of a particular purpose). SeeKirk, supra note 154. at 36-37,41-42.
0 Greater levels of application and detail may be seen as more intrusive on states' regulatory
authority, and thus as bearing on the degree of injury to the states' interests. Yet, if states do
not have constitutionally protected rights to exercise regulatory authority free of federal inter-
vention, on what constitutional basis could courts interfere with the national legislature's leewny
to accomplish its goals provided there is a sufficient connection to a national enumerated
power? SegenerallyMcCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Mheat.) 316 (1819).
-0 In Germany, there are subjects on which the federal government may enact 'frantework
statutes" that must leave substantial room for the subnational units (called 1"nder) to enact laws
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tion of proportionality review to federalism-based challenges to na-
tional power should be highly deferential to legislative judgments in
order to minimize risks of judicial invalidation based on disagree-
ment over "policy" issues concerning the scope of federal regulation.
One could still ask, though, whether the federal law is plausibly re-
lated to a subject over which the federal government has power to act
- a basic requisite of constitutional government being that govern-
ments act only as they are authorized by law.16 Understood in this
sense, the proportionality test of Mores could function as a more re-
spectful version of a "purpose" or "legitimate ends" test207 (similar in
some ways to the Canadian "pith and substance" test20 s for evaluating
whether the federal government, or the provinces, have authority to
legislate on particular issues). A disproportional law may be a law not
really designed for one asserted purpose but to sweep more broadly
or in other directions.2 9 In this sense, Fores's proportionality test may
be a reinvigoration of the "legitimate end" test of McCulloch v. Mary-
land,210 through a mechanism perhaps less difficult to administer, in
light of the challenges of identifying a collective legislative intent and
the reluctance of courts to attribute improper motives to a coordinate
branch of government. But, using "proportionality" as a surrogatefor "purpose" in the federalism context requires a highly deferential
filling in the details. See BASic LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, Art. 75 (Official
translation, revised edition, March 1995) (providing that "the Federation has the right to enact
framework legislation for legislation of the MInder on" a number of subjects, including "general
principles of higher education," "the general legal status of the press," and "land distribution,"
and further providing that "Framework legislation may only in exceptional cases contain de-
tailed or directly applicable provisions," and imposing duty on lfinder to introduce implement-
inegislation in timely fashion).
20 SeeJackson, Federalism, supra note 36, at 2224-25.
For a discussion of surrogates for purpose tests in U.S. constitutional law, see Fallon, supra
note 176, at 94-95 (examining content-based and effects-based tests as substitutes for purpose
test). Cf Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1976) (noting that a law's disproportionate
imgact may bear on whether the law will be found to have an impermissible purpose).
See, e.g., Labatt Breweries v. Attorney Gen. [1980] 1 S.C.R. 914; HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW OF CANADA, supra note 46, at 377 et seq. (discussing "pith and substance" test to "character-
ize" the leading feature, or true nature and character, of the challenged law). Hogg further
states that the "pith and substance" test is not used to evaluate claims that Charter rights have
been infringed but rather to evaluate whether federal and provincial laws are within their re-
spective heads of power. Id. at 377 n.21.
Cf Note, supra note 110, at 124-25 (analyzing Eisenstadt v. Baird).
20 See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) ("Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the
scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to
that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional.").
2 See Fallon, supra note 176, at 131-32 (treating Flores' Section 5 analysis as resting on a
"purpose" test). Recall suggestions in early constitutional cases in the U.S. that different "pur-
poses" could authorize federal and state regulation of the same area, see, e.g., Wilson v. Black-Bird
Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829) (upholding state law draining creek for health pur-
poses though action might block federally-licensed interstate navigation) and Hogg's sugges-
tion that the "pith and substance" test serves a similar purpose in Canada. See HOGG,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA, supra note 46, at 378.
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stance towards Congress's use of its powers, to be overcome only in
the presence of a very clear disproportionality between legitmate end
and chosen means.
Assume for the moment that one agreed with Smith's view on the
scope of the Free Exercise Clause and further agreed with Flores'view
that Congress's only role in Section 5 was to remedy or prevent Sec-
tion I violations as the Court defined them. On these large as-
sumptions, the conclusion that followed - that this statute could not
be upheld as an effort to prevent or remedy those kinds of violations
- seems quite plausible. Notwithstanding early critique of the pro-
portionality standard that it offers "little if any principled guidance as
to where the line will be drawn in any particular case,' the Court's
conclusion that RFRA sweeps more broadly than a law designed to
prevent what the Court would find to be invidiously motivated inter-
ferences with religious freedom seems reasonable, in light of the leg-
islative record's suggestion that the principal problem to which RFRA
was directed was the adverse effect on minority religious practices of
neutral, generally-applicable statutes..2 " Application of a proportion-
212 See also Kirk, supra note 154, at 41 (suggesting that courts in Australia use proportionality
"as indicative of purpose" by asking "whether the imbalance, or availability of alternative means.
was of such a dear, gross or overahdming nature as to prevent the measure reasonably being char-
acterized as having been made with respect to the claimed legitimate purpose") (emphasis in
original); HOGG, CONSTITLIONAL LAW OF CANADA, supra note 46. at 390 (arguing for judicial
restraint in invalidating laws on federalism grounds where the choice between competing char-
acterizations is not dear). Cf. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374. 403 (1994) (StevensJ., dis-
senting) (suggesting that the test of proportionality of land use condition to costs created b,
landowner's proposed change is appropriate "only if the developer establishes that a conced-
edly germane condition is so grossly disproportionate to the proposed development's adverse
effects that it manifests motives other than land use regulation on the part of tie city.).
213 But see infra part IV below (questioning these aspects of Flores pecially in light of the
Fourteenth Amendment's explicit reliance on Congress to enforce its substantive provisions).
214 See Cole, supra, note 71, at 229; see also Noonan, supra note 71, at 470-71 (criticizing pro-
portionality test as unprecedented and without meaning). Interestingly, Noonan has elsewhere
described the role of proportionality in the principle of "double effect" JOjN T. NOO.NN,JL.,
THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENcE AND REUGIOUS FREEDOM 203 (1993)
(describing principle of "double effect' which "supposes one action, one good intention, and
two simultaneous effects, one good and one bad; and to be moral the bad effect must be unin-
tended and not be greater than the good effect In other words, a judgment is required that
the bad is not disproportionate to the good"). Noonan's dialogue considers whether this prin-
ciple could guide public decisions about government accommodation of religion, but ulti-
mately the principal interrogator concludes not. See i&. at 205-06 (raising concerns about the
workability and subjectivity of the approach).
2 Note that there are at least three kinds of constitutional decisions involved in the Fores
Court's federalism-based analysis of RFRA: first, whether "disproportionate impact' practices
are prohibited by the Free Exercise Clause; second, whether one can draw an inference con-
cerning what the Court would recognize as discriminatory intent from the enactment of statutes
that are facially-neutral but have a disproportionate impact; and finally, assuming a plausible
basis for finding a violation of the substantive provisions, what means can Congress design to
combat it. On all three of these issues, the Congress and the Court may have had different
vieus. For an effort tojustify RFRA as preventing invidious treatment of minority religions. see
Laycocl supra note 71 at 771-79 (arguing that Smith, together with Church of the Luhumi Balalu
Aye, Ina v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), should not be read to require proof of hostile
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ality test might reasonably lead the Court to conclude that the pur-
ported remedial justification - that the statute was needed to prevent
invidiously-intended, bad treatment of minority religious groups -
was a fictive fig leaf or an after-the-fact justification designed to paper
over the real contest - a disagreement between Congress and the
Court on the meaning of religious liberty.1
Having said this, one might still be troubled about whether the
"proportionality and congruence" standard of Flores contemplates a
more activist role forjudicial review than has developed under McCul-
loch's standard for reviewing whether federal legislation is within fed-
eral power.217 One might be particularly concerned in light of the
U.S. history of review of the "appropriateness" of civil rights legisla-
tion so rigorous as to undermine the egalitarian goals of the Recon-
struction Amendments. 8 Canadian (and European) proportionality
analyses in individual rights cases suggest that it might be rational, if
not wise, to take an action that could not meet the more rigorous
formulations of proportionality testing.219 But a look at the constitu-
tional jurisprudence of Australia offers a way of thinking about the
proportionality standard that may be useful, cabining proportionality
analysis to a highly deferential inquiry in which only gross dispropor-
tionality would be a basis for invalidation, essentially as a surrogate
motive if a statute provided less favorable treatment to religiously motivated than to secularly
motivated conduct through statutory exemptions, and accordingly there exist a larger number
of laws that should not be regarded as "generally applicable" and a more substantial number of
constitutional violations than k/ores assumed).
216 In Rores, Respondent Archbishop Flores argued in favor of the constitutionality of the
RFRA in part on the ground that the legislation was designed to prevent difficult-to-prove in-
vidious religious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997); Brief of Respondent Flores at 23-24, Flores (No. 95-
2074). Petitioner's Reply Brief argued that defending RFRA as a statute that enforces the Equal
Protection Clause was "a pretext," and argued that the Court could invalidate the statute as hav-
ing an improper "purpose" without entailing a difficult inquiry into legislative "motive." See Re-
ply Brief of Petitioner at 4, Rores (No. 95-2074).
217 For academic comment to the effect that the standard is more rigorous, see, for example,
McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation, supra note 71, at 165; Laycock, supra note 71, at 770;
but cf Ira C. Lupu, Why the Congress Was Wrong and the Court Was Right - Reflections on City of
Boerne v. Flores, 39 WMa. & MARY L. REV. 793, 815 (1998) (arguing that while a "rigorous re-
quirement of congruence" would be "revolutionary," "narrower readings of Rlores exist and in-
volve less tension with" constitutional tradition).
218 See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 10-15 (1883) (holding unconstitutional federal
law prohibiting race discrimination by inns and other public places, and narrowly construing
Fourteenth Amendment, in light of Tenth Amendment, to reach only "state action of a praticu-
lar character"); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 557 (1875) (construing the Fotur-
teenth Amendment narrowly and invalidating indictment for interfence with the right to as-
semble).
219 See, e.g., RJR MacDonald, Inc. v. Canada [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, 342-48 (McLachlin, J.)
(striking down prohibition on all tobacco advertisements; while legislation was rational means
toward legitimate goal of reducing smoking, the complete bar could not be sustained under
Charter section 1 because it did not minimally impair free expression rights, the government
not having explained why a partial bar on "lifestyle" advertising designed to increase consump-
tion, but not on "brand preference" advertising directed at existing smokers to increase market
share, would not have been as effective).
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for purpose analysis.
In Australia, the idea of proportionality has been applied to re-
view challenges to federal action as outside the scope of federal
power. Australian writers describe the concept as inspired by the
European Court ofJustice and European Court of Human Rights' ju-
risprudence.2 Jeremy Kirk, an Australian scholar, has suggested that
the concept of proportionality has different roles to play in federal-
ism as compared to individual rights cases. He argues that in assess-
ing whether an act of the federal government "can be characterized
as having a sufficient link" to a head of federal power "to be valid,"
proportionality can serve as "an objective test of purpose."2' In as-
sessing the validity of a "purposive" federal power, he suggests, ele-
ments of the proportionality test must be employed more narrowly.
"[t]he court would have to ask whether availability of less restrictive
means, or the imbalance [of benefits and harms], was of such an
overwhelming nature as to make it clear that the law could not rea-
sonably be characterized as having been made with respect to the
claimed legitimate purpose. "2
In other words, the argument is that courts should - in order to
avoid inappropriate second-guessing of legislative decision-making -
invalidate laws as outside federal power only where the law is so
grossly disproportionate to the asserted goal as to cast doubt on the
validity of the purported purpose. In order to avoid a quagmire of
constitutional uncertainty in the U.S. constitutional setting, given
both the lack of discrete areas reserved to the states as matters of
regulatory jurisdiction and the constitutionally-protected participa-
tion of states in constituting the federal government2 a judicial pol-
20 See M inister for Resources v. Dover Fisheries Pry Ltd, 116 AuLPR. 54 (1993); see also Kirk.
supra note 154, at 2. For a detailed description of proportionality as a concept in the European
Union, see EMIIIOU, supra note 78, at 115-265.
22 See Kirk supra note 154, at 2, 6. In Australia the process of determining 'hether a federal
law is supported by one of its enumerated powers is referred to as "characterization.' For im-
plied or incidental powers, analogous to those contemplated by the US. Necessary and Proper
Clause, purpose is always relevant See id. at 22 (citations omiued). Other enumerated po-wers,
although not all of them, are deemed to have a purposiveness requirement, including the
power over external affairs and defense. Proportionality in Australia has been used to deter-
mine whether a law can be "characterisable as in fact adapted to achieve" a legitimate purpose.
Id. at 22; see also H.P. Lee, Proportionaliy in Austmlian Constitutional Adjudication, in FLTL'RE
DIRECrIONS IN AUSTRALUAN CONSTrrLTONAL LW: EssMs IN HONOUR OF PROFEsSOR LESUE
ZINSS 126, 130-31 (Geoffrey Lindell, ed. 1994) (noting the similarity between established "pro-
portionality" test to determine validity of regulations in administrative law, and its use to deter-
mine constitutionality of national legislation). While acknowledging concern that a propor-
tionality test could invite judges impermissibly to intrude on legislative functions, Lee argues
that somejudicial review of the "degree" of connection between legislative action and legislative
power is necessary to hold the legislature to rule of law standards. Lee, supra, at 148.
Kirk, supra note 154, at 24-25.
2n For a classic statement, see Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism. The Role
of the States in the Composition and Seetion of the National Gormmmnt, 54 COLUM. L R '. 543, 559-
60 (1954) (Court is on the weakest ground in opposing its view of Constitution to that of Con-
gress in the interests of the states); see also, JESSE R CHOPER, JUDICIAL REiEW .D THE
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icy of highly deferential review of exercises of federal power (not
claimed to violate individual fights) makes sense. While Congress's
institutional attention to the needs and interests of the different
states is not a reason for refraining from judicial review altogether, it
is a reason for highly deferential judicial review. 4 With this impor-
tant caveat - that the proportionality of congressional means to the
claimed purpose is reviewed with considerable deference225 - the in-
troduction of the concept of proportionality in Flores could be rela-
tively benign.226 It certainly provides an occasion for further com-
parative reflection on the use of this concept elsewhere and its (some
might say) strange absence from U.S. constitutional law.
I recognize the strength of David Cole's point that a proportional-
ity test does not tell where the line will be drawn. 2 ' But, such a test
NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 171-259 (1980) (arguing that federalism-based challenges to na-
tional power should be nonjusticiable).
24 See generally Jackson, Federalism, supra note 36, at 2226-28 & n.206, 2230-55. A distinctive
feature of current U.S. constitutional law may also identify a particular function for the Flores
proportionality test: Federal regulation of state governments as such under Article I powers,
(e.g. commerce clause) may be permitted (notwithstanding the anti-commandeering rule of
Printz) if the federal statute even-handedly applies to private entities as well. See New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178 (1992). For purposes of the Commerce Clause, the distinction
between federal commands to states as such, and federal regulations that fall even-handedly on
states and private entities engaged in the same behavior, can be defended on a number of
grounds as providing adequate protection to the states from federal regulation that interferes
with their ability to function as independent governments. SeeJackson, Federalism, supra note
36, at 2206-07. But federal regulation under the Fourteenth Amendment, unlike most Com-
merce Clause regulations, is necessarily directed at state power. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3 (1883). Given the very purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment to constrain the exercise
of governmental power, it would not make sense to extend the "regulate like private entities"
rationale, by which the Court has, provisionally, maintained the possibility of congressional
regulation of states when acting under Article I powers, to congressional enforcement of the
Fourteenth Amendment. If Congress's Fourteenth Amendment power to define prohibited
state action under Section 1 were unlimited, Congress would have unlimited power to eliminate
state governments' independence. To the extent that, even after enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment, state governments retain a role as institutional counterbalances to Congress, it
would be inconsistent to allow Congress to destroy the states. The F/ares requirement of propor-
tionality, properly administered, might thus be a substitute for constraints on Congress's regula-
tion of the states in other areas, and justified by the need to assure that the national govern-
ment cannot destroy the state governments, while at the same time allowing the federal
government ample latitude to prohibit the states from engaging in practices that arguably vio-
late the provisions of Section 1.
Cf. Lee, supra note 221, at 131, 148-49 (arguing for proportionality review of legislation
"bolstered by a measure ofjudicial deference").
226 Fores also has the potential to be considerably less than benign; a broad reading of its ra-
tionale could threaten the constitutionality of, for example, applying to the states Title Vll's
"disparate impact" approach, or the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, both of which provide for
relief on a showing that would not necessarily meet the Supreme Court's standards for estab-
lishing violations of the Equal Protection Clause. See generally Laycock, supra note 71, at 747-58.
While both of these statutes may be sustainable as even-handed regulations of states as employ-
ers, see supra note 224 (discussing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)) to the extent
they are grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment F/ores poses some risk (though perhaps more
from the Court's holding that Congress cannot go beyond the Court's definition of what Sec-
tion 1 prohibits than its holding on proportionality).
W SeeCole, supra note 71, at 47.
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does permit one to say that some statutes are a closer fit, are more
proportional, to a constitutional wrong, than are others. And ulti-
mately, isn't what is enough of a fit a question of judgment under
many of the tests? How rigorously proportionality will be applied may
depend on the degree of deference given to Congress's determina-
dons - whether Congress behaved rationally in concluding that the
statute was proportional, or whether some more rigorous standard
will be applied (which I would not favor).- In Flores, however, Con-
gress's main motivation in some sense was a disagreement with the
Smith Court on what counts as a substantive violation.229 Thus, the
standard of deference was arguably irrelevant: proportionality in l/o-
res was being used as an alternative to screening for impermissible
legislative purpose.
Does this discussion mean that the U.S. Supreme Court was either
right or wrong in adopting a proportionality test in Flores? Perhaps
neither. Ultimately, courts and commentators cannot avoid coming
to grips with the historical reverberations of particular approaches
For a discussion of the basis forjudicial deference to Congress in reviewing federalism-
based challenges to congressional action, see Jackson, Federalism, supra note 36. at 2227. (argu-
ing that Herbert Wechsler's argument that the structure of the national political process cre-
ated by the Constitution tended to assure that states' interests were considered by Congress still
has much merit, and that federal constitutional arrangements require a certain pragmatic give
in thejoints to function effectively over time).
While it may be somewhat more rigorous than the "mere rationality* standard, propor-
tionality review in the Fourteenth Amendment context, if limited to instances of grns disproper-
tionaliti, may do little seriously to impair Congress's power creatively to insist that states provide
equal protection and due process of law to all. Note that the Flores Court refers with approval to
its earlier decision in South Carolina v. Katenbach, 383 U.S. 301,334 (1966) (upholding the Vot-
ing Rights Act's suspension of literacy tests for five years in light of evidence that such tests had
been used to exclude blacks from voting, and a concern that their use would freeze the effects
of past intentional discrimination in the voter rolls). Moreover, the Court in South Carolina n,.
Katzenbach upheld a provision suspending any change in state voting rules or practices until
federal authorities had reviewed them, a novel and intrusive step justified, the Court said, by the
"extraordinary stratagem" states had in the past and might in the future adopt to exclude citi-
zens from voting because of their race. 329 U.S. at 334, 329-31. While the Court did not explic-
itly refer to proportionality, its suggestion that extraordinary resistance justifies unusual re-
sponses, is consistent with the approach.
Other rationales that may sustain the requirement of proportionality go to whether efforts
to promote the free exercise of religion by mandating accommodation would violate the prohi-
bitions on federal establishment of religion. See R/reo, 521 U.S. at 536-37 (Stevens, J. concur-
ring); cf. Jed Rubenfeld, Antidisestablishmentaianism IWay RFRA Reat Was Unwonstitutiona 95
MicH. L. REv. 2347 (1997) (arguing that RFRA violates Establishment Clause). On whether the
inquiry itself might be incompatible with the judicial role, see Mark Tuslnet, Tuo 1 rsins of
Judicial Supremac, 39 WM. & MARY L REV. 945, 947-48 (1998). See aLso forrs, 521 U.S. at 513
(discussing the Court's evaluation and rejection, in Smith, of the Sherbert standard which re-
quired courts to determine whether a particular practice was central to an individual's religion
- a determination that, according to the Court, is "not within the judicial ken') (quelingShuth,
494 U.S. at 887). This article does not address these arguments other than to note that for
those who believe that the two prongs of the religion clauses can come into conflict with each
other at points of accommodation, this may provide an additional reason to identify some test
for the validity of congressional power apart from the rational basis test into which MeCullazh v.
Marfyland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819), had developed.
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
within their own polities. In this light, the nineteenth century U.S.
Court's hobbling of enforcement of the Reconstruction Amendments
stands as an important caution in embracing "proportionality analy-
sis" of federalism-based challenges to national laws, particularly out-
side the above-discussed inquiry into "gross disproportionality."
Knowledge of the strikingly comparable developments of "propor-
tionality" as a concept in other constitutional systems, however, and
of their more intricate articulations of the proportionality test (in
both individual rights and federalism issues) can inform decision of
the range of consequences for adoption of this approach in the
United States.
IV. FLORES, COMPARATIVE SOURCES
AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVERSATION
Fores is relevant to this article not only in its use of proportionality
as a concept in constitutional law, but also in another way: it suggests
that the Court may, at times, be unecessarily close-minded in its ap-
preciation of congressional input on constitutional interpretation in
ways not unconnected to its resistance to comparative constitutional
influences.
There is much room for disagreement with the F/ores Court. Its
reliance on the drafting history of the Fourteenth Amendment for
the proposition that Congress was not intended to play a role in de-
fining the substantive reach of the Section 1 rights is based on a
highly contestable reading of that history.20 And the scope of the free
exercise clause itself is a difficult question, the Smith decision, leaving
many constitutional scholars, as well as politicians, deeply troubled.'
But here I would like to consider arguments made by both David
Cole and Michael McConnell,232 that the Court's assertion of judicial
230 Compare City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520-24 (arguing that redrafting of provi-
sions of Section 1 was designed to allay fears that Congress would have too much power) with
McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation, supra note 71, at 177-81 (arguing that the redrafted
provision does not as a matter of language reduce Congress's power and was not understood by
its drafters to do so). The Court's suggestion that its interpretation of Sections 1 and 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, as limiting Congress to the design of remedial legislation, but not to a
role in defining the substantive scope of Section 1, is "significant also in maintaining the tradi-
tional separation of powers between the Congress and thejudiciary," Fores, 521 U.S. at 523-24,
is peculiarly circular. It could be argued that the Fourteenth Amendment changed those rela-
tionsjust as it changed federal state-relations, to the extent contemplated by the Amendment.
Indeed, since the Fourteenth Amendment was designed in part to overturn Dred Scott v. Sand-
ford, 101 Howard 393 (1857) such a reading is hardly implausible.
See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. Ctii. L.
REV. 1109 (1990) [hereinafter, McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism]; see also Christopher L. Eis-
gruber and Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69
N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 442-45 (1994) (criticizing the Court's decision in Employment Division v.
Smith, but also arguing against RFRA).
22 See Cole, supra note 71, at 59-64 (arguing that Congress has particular institutional compe-
tence in interpreting the Constitution that should be given more deference than did the Bores
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supremacy in interpretation need not have been accompanied by the
implicit claim ofjudicial exclusivity in interpretation of constitutional
provisions or by what appeared as a studied refusal to reconsider the
constitutional question of Smith in light of Congress's findings and
concerns.2s Given Congress's explicit constitutional role in enforcing
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court might have found congres-
sional views relevant, particularly since the Court itself was closely di-
vided in Smith. Instead, the Court suggested that Congress should
have recognized the stare decisis principles that would mandate judi-
cial adherence to Smith and implied that Congress should not have
challenged the Court's decision in Smith through enactment of a
statute premised, in part, on disagreement with Smith."
But, was it inappropriate for Congress to test the limits of both the
Smith principle, and of stare decisis, by enacting legislation that rested,
in part, on a different constitutional theory?
This argument, while only implicit in Flores, is related to the ar-
guments made by the plurality in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, - that
the Court should adhere to certain past decisions particularly when
confronted with political pressure to change an existing interpreta-
tion.2m Critics counter that, particularly because it is a constitution
being expounded, the Court should change its interpretation when
persuaded that it is wrong (and can make the change without unset-
Court); McConnell, Institutions and Intrpretation, supra note 71, at 155-56, 171-74 (arguing that
the independent judgment of Congress on a constitutional question is relev,-t to judicial in-
terpretation, especially in areas, such as the Free Exercise Clause, where there is plausible sup-
port for multiple interpretations).
See Rores, 521 U.S. at 515 (describing floor debates in which members of Congress dis-
cussed points of constitutional interpretation and criticized the Court's reasoning in Smith); id.
at 536 (stating that once the Court has interpreted the Constitution, the political branches 'act
against the background of [that] interpretation" and that "RFRA contradicts vital principles
necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance"). The Court indicated that
once it had made a constitutional decision, it "will treat its precedents with tie respect due
them under settled principles, including stare derisis, and contrary expectations must be disap-
pointed." Id. Thus, the Court rather clearly implies that the more expansihe viuws of rights
protected expressed by Congress in subsequent legislation are irrelevant.
Interestingly, Justice O'Connor's dissent, joined by Justice Breyer, seems to agree. She
wrote that if she did not disagree with Smith, she would have joined dte part of die Court's opin-
ion in which this discussion is found because "when [Congress] enacts legislation in further-
ance of its delegated powers, Congress must make its judgments consistent wiith this Court's
exposition of the Constitution and with the limits placed on its legislative authoritn i, provi-
sions such as the Fourteenth Amendment." Hora, 521 U.S. at 545-46. justice O'Connor's posi-
tion is surprising, since she also argues that the case should be used as a ehicle to reconsider
Smith, and notes that stare dedsis is not a barrier to reconsideration because Simth is "demonstra-
bly wrong" and "is a recent decision [that] has not engendered dte kind of reliance on its con-
tinued application that would militate against overruling it." I& at 548. Why, if justice
O'Connor believes that the Court could appropriately overrule Smith, would it be inappropriate
for Congress to provide such an opportunity to the Court through the enactment of RFRk:.
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
See i&t at 867 ("[T]o overrule under fire in the absence of the most compelling reason to
reexamine a watershed decision would subvert the Court's legitinmcy bevond an serious ques-
tion.").
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fling reliance interests on which law and political arrangements
rest) .237 If this critique of the stare decisis argument in Casey is correct,
afortiori it cannot be the case that the political branches are bound by
separation of powers principles not to legislate on a plausible, com-
peting constitutional theory.
It is not so much the assertion ofjudicial supremacy in interpreta-
tion with which I am concerned, 2 8 but rather the suggestion that
Congress violates the separation of powers in enacting a statute prem-
ised on a different constitutional theory and the implication that the
Court should refuse to consider Congress's views on substantive ques-
tions. The latter, at least, raises echoes of the Printz Court's unwill-
ingness to consider foreign constitutional practices in resolving U.S.
constitutional questions. In the one case, foreign constitutional deci-
sions might be worthy of consideration because they reflect reasoned
judgments of other judges faced with similar problems.239 In the
other, congressional views of the Constitution might be worthy of
note because they come from a coordinate branch carrying out con-
stitutional responsibilities of lawmaking and because they may reflect
substantial general understandings of constitutional meanings. Con-
stitutional adjudication probably cannot depart too far and too often
from such understandings.
Should the practices and views of foreign constitutional systems,
of the state courts, or of the Congress, be dispositive or controlling in
constitutional adjudication? Surely not. Although compelling argu-
ments exist for why Congress should have ample latitude to address
237 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 954-57 (Rehnqist, CJ., dissenting); see also ChristopherJ. Peters Fool-
ish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity, and Justice in Stare Decisis, 105 YALE L. J. 2031, 2046 n.71
(1996) (stating that as a ground for not overruling, controversiality of prior decisions "becomes
absurd if taken literally"). But cf. Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudidal Con-
stitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1539 (1997) (arguing that what the Supreme Court
says must be treated as binding all other actors in order to serve the "coordination" functions of
having a final decision-maker that constitutionalism requires). For a response see Tushnet, su-
pra note 229, at 952-59 (challenging Alexander and Schauer's conclusion that courts rather
than legislature should play "settlement" function).
238 One might believe that the Court's decision on constitutional matters must have priority
over the views of other branches of government, and still believe that the system must be struc-
tured to allow opportunities for the views and positions of the other branches in disagreement
with the Court to be considered by the Court through subsequent legal challenges.
2s9 Cf Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 389 (1994) (relying upon state court decisions
about when a government regulation is a taking as an appropriate guide to development of a
distinctive federal rule requiring "proportionality" between the conditions imposed and the
benefits sought when a property owner requests a land use variance). The Court's occasional
willingness to consider the views of the state courts on constitutional questions typically litigated
there provides one model for considering the views of other constitutional courts. One might
distinguish the Court's consideration of state cases from consideration of foreign decisions on
the ground that state courts address identical issues under the identical constitution, whereas
foreign decisions necessarily address different constitutions, even where the constitutional lan-
guage is purportedly similar. But see Dolan, 512 U.S. at 398 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (pointing
out that none of the state court cases announced anything akin to the Court's "rough propor-
tionality" rule and noting that most of the state court cases cited by the majority relied on state
law or other unspecified grounds, rather than on the federal Constitution).
[Vol. 1: 3
1999] AMBIVALENTRESISTANCEAMV) COMPARATII CONSTITtrrIONAL.I&I 637
what it sees as constitutional violations under Section 1 in the exer-
cise of its Section 5 power, to construe the provision as affording
Congress unfettered and unreviewable choice would probably yield
too much power to maintain a constitutional balance. Moreover,
wel-reasoned and explained Court decisions can influence public
and congressional understanding of the Constitution.
But are Congress's views on constitutional meaning irrelevant,
and impermissible, on the question of scope? I would think not.
Even the Court's view recognizes that the purported dividing line be-
tween substance and remedy is an uncertain one, and yields substan-
tial deference to Congress on preventive and remedial issues. Being
aware of Congress's considered views on the meaning of a substantive
provision might well be relevant to sound constitutional adjudication,
which, at least in reference to federalism issues, is an exercise of gov-
ernance that must be both principled and pragmatic. 2
Why, then, the Court's tone of rebuke to Congress in Flores, and of
parochialism in Printz. Maybe just happenstance, but perhaps they
are symptoms of current anxieties about the role of the Court, and of
U.S. judicial review,241 to which I alluded earlier. Congress has chal-
lenged the Court's interpretations, both statutory and constitutional,
repeatedly in recent years.42 The very tides of the statutes constitute
24 SeeJackson, Federalis7, supra note 36, at 2228-31, 2257-58.
241 See also Honritz, supra note 139, at 38-40 (suggesting that the 'turn to histof and explicit
preoccupation with legitimacy in the plurality opinion in Casey were symptoms of *a crisis of
legitimacy in constitutional thought in which the generally accepted paradigms... are no
longer felt capable of yielding convincing solutions to constitutional questions"); cf. Louis Mi-
chael Seidman, This Essay Is BrilliantfThis Essay is Stupid: Positive and Negatne S&lf.Rrftrmice m Con-
stitutional Practie and Theory, 46 U.C.L.A. L REv. 501, 504-06 (1998) (finding pervasive founda-
tional disagreement in modem constitutional law, discussing how tis phenomena is reflected
in Supreme Court opinions, and arguing that "loudly insisting on the truth of one's own state-
ments can ... suggest an insecurity as to their truth" reflecting this absence of fundamental
agreement).
, Congress did so, for example, in enacting RFRA to provide greater protection for relig-
ious practices than provided by Smith v. Employmevt Ditision, 494 U.S. 872, 876-79 (1990), and by
enacting a federal flag burning statute, albeit with different language, after tlie Court struck
down a state flag burning statute, see U.S. v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (holding that tie
Flag Protection Act of 1989, passed in response to tie Court's striking of a state flag-burning
statute in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), was also unconstitutional). Moreover, in re-
enacting the Gun Free School Zones Law, albeit with an element of Oaffecting commerce
added, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1998), Congress indirectly challenged tie Court's decision hold-
ing unconstitutional a gun ban in U.S. v. Lope , 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Apart from these constitu-
tional confrontations, Congress has repeatedly overturned the Court's interpretations of federal
statutes in several areas, including, for example, (1) federal civil rights statutes. see e.g., Grove
City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984) (leading to the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987);
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (leading to tie Civil Rights Act of
1991); see also Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 511 U.S. 244, 251 (1994) (describing the 1991 law as
a response to several Court decisions); (2) federal laws relating to tle sovereign immunity of
the United States, for example, U.S. Dept. of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607 (1992) (holding that
even though the United States was a "person" subject to suit under certain environmental laws,
it could not be sued for state-imposed punitive damages) (leading to the Federal Facility Com-
pliance Act of 1992, 106 Stat. 1505, amending laws to provide specifically that federal agencies
were not immune from such awards); and (3) the amenability of states to being sued for liabili-
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a visible confrontation with the Court - the Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act, the Civil Rights Restoration Act - implying that Congress
is restoring what the Court took away. This is in contrast to other pe-
riods in the Court's history when its most contentious rulings were
those imposing limitations on states and were supported (or at least
not challenged) at the national level. The justices may also perceive
themselves under greater scrutiny and attack by Congress at an ad-
ministrative level .2  Finally, members of the Court cannot help but be
aware of the increased interest in, and familiarity with, other systems
of constitutional adjudication whose courts function well even
though structured quite differently from those of the United States.
All of these factors may contribute to the Court's defensiveness and
assertiveness in excluding interpretive sources not more within the
Court's control. Yet in the constitutional conversation of which adju-
dication is a major part, open-mindedness and a willingness to be
humble about the correctness of one's views may actually go farther
in preserving the rightful legitimacy of the Court.
I am guardedly optimistic that U.S. courts will be more open to
foreign constitutional learning in the future. In 1996, for instance,
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, addressing the American College of
Trial Lawyers, had this to say:
I think that I, and the other Justices of the U.S. Supreme
Court, will find ourselves looking more frequently to the
decisions of other constitutional courts. Some, like the
ties under federal statutes such as the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Federal Rehabilitation
Act, discussed in Vicki C. Jackson, One Hundred Years of Folly: The Eleventh Amendment and the
1988 Term, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 51, 83 n.141, 89-90 nn.161-162 (1990). See generally William N.
Eskridge,Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991).
243 Federal elected officials, including the President, the Congress, and its members have
challenged federal judges across an array of the activities in recent years. For congressional
challenges to federal courts' sponsorship of studies of gender and race equality in their courts,
see Todd Peterson, Studying the Impact of Race and Ethnicity in the Federal Courts, 64 GEO. WAStI. L.
REV. 173, 175, 186-88 (1996) (describing how Senators Gramm, Grassley and Hatch denounced
and tried to defund federal court-sponsored studies of gender and race equality). For an exam-
pie of unusual congressional oversight of how federal judges spend their time, see U.S. Senate
Judiciary Comm. on Adm. Oversight and the Courts, Report on Judicial Survey (May 1996) (de-
scribing survey of federal judges concerning how much time they spent on activities such as
education and case management). For challenges to a federal judge's individual adjudicatory
decision by elected officials (outside the ordinary course of U.S. Attorney's office litigation),
see, for example, Linda Greenhouse, RehnquistJoins Fray in Rulings, Defending Judicial Independce,
N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 10, 1996, at Al (describing attacks on Judge Harold Baer for exclusion of evi-
dence in drug cases). In 1996, Congress and the President also passed the first major spate of
jurisdiction-stripping legislation to be enacted in many decades. See generally Symposium, Con-
gress and the Courts, 86 GEO. L. J. 2445 (1998) (discussing the potential impact of federal laws
restricting the jurisdiction and remedial powers of the federal courts across a range of litigation
brought by prisoners and immigrants); Exordium, Suspension and Supremacy, Judicial Power and
Jurisdiction: The Availability and Scope of Habeas Corpus After AEDPA and IIRIRA, 98 COLUINt. L. RFv.
695 (1998) (discussing effect of AEDDPA and IIRIRA on federal courts'jurisdiction in habeas
relief in the post-conviction and executive detention contexts).
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German and Italian courts, have been working since the last
world war. They have struggled with the same basic consti-
tutional questions that we have: equal protection, due proc-
ess, the rule of law in constitutional democracies. Others,
like the South African court, are relative newcomers on the
scene but have already entrenched themselves as guarantors
of civil rights. All these courts have something to teach us
about the civilizing functions of constitutional law."
In 1989, ChiefJustice Rehnluist made a similar call for learning from
other constitutional courts. Perhaps, then, the United States is be-
ginning to be ready to open up the constitutional conversation, if not
across institutional borders between the branches of government,
then across national borders with other courts.
244 Sandra Day O'Connor, Broadening Our Horizons: g7' Amticn Judges and Lawyers Must
Learn About Foreign Law, 1997 Spring meeting, American College of Trial La%)vrs, reprinted in 4
INT'L JUDICIAL OBSERVERJune 1997 at 2 (publication jointly sponsored by the Federal Judicial
Center and the American Society of International Law).
245 See discussion supra text accompanying notes 11-12.
